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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
COOPERJOHN ANTHONY VAN 
HUIZEN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20140602-CA 
District Court Case No. 131902542 
Juvenile Court Case No. 1003447 
TURISDICTION 
~ 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(c) and (e) provide the Court's jurisdiction over 
~ appeals from Serious Youth Offender bindover orders and second degree felony 
convictions. 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Cooper brings his claims under the ineffective assistance of counsei plain error, and 
exceptional circumstances doctrines. The instances of error meriting relief under those 
0 doctrines include: 
1. counsel's ineffective assistance during the Serious Youth Offender preliminary 
hearing; 
2. the juvenile court's misinterpretation of the 2013 amended version of the Serious 
Youth Offender statute; and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. the juvenile court judge's failure to disqualify herself from presiding over Cooper's 
Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing despite being married to the Chief Deputy of 
the Criminal Division of the office prosecuting Cooper, and fonnerly working in that office 
in the same position as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor. 
Cooper invokes the cumulative error doctrine. This involves consideration of all 
identified and assumed errors, and requires reversal if the errors undennine confidence in 
the fairness of the proceedings. See,~ State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,I 13, 275 P.3d 
1050. 
It appears that the juvenile court's ruling on the bindover order satisfies the 
preservation requirements for appeal from that ruling, see State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ,I 
13, 61 P.3d 1062 (issues are preserved for appeal ruled upon), and that challenges to such 
rulings are properly initiated on appeal, see,~ State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,r,i 27-35, 
79 P.3d 951 (correcting juvenile court's errors in Serious Youth Offender bindover order 
without discussing preservation). The claims were raised in district court in post-sentence 
motions (R. 80-99, 110-112, 219-235, 414-456, 472-92, 508-524). The district court refused 
to hold a hearing or reach the merits of the claims (R. 464-65, 586-98). In denying a 
certificate of probable cause, the district court opined that Cooper's claims were not 
reasonably likely to result in reversal (R. 595-96). 
Juvenile court bindover applications of law to facts are granted limited deference on 
appeal. E.g., State v. I.RC., 2010 UT 41, ,I ,I 12,232 P.3d 1040. 
This Court will address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were not ruled 
2 
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on below as matters of law, without deference to the lower courts. E.g., State v. Ellifritz, 
835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). To establish ineffective assistance, Cooper must 
specify acts or omissions that were objectively unreasonable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984). He must overcome the presumption that counsel's strategies 
were "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. 
The plain error doctrine requires proof of an obvious and prejudicial error, and 
provides relief from less obvious but highly prejudicial errors. See, ~ State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
To show prejudice under both doctrines, Cooper must show a reasonable likelihood 
of a different result in the absence of the error. See, ~ State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 
n.15 (Utah 1989); Strickland at 687. 
The Court corrects rare procedural anomalies otherwise resulting in miscarriages of 
justice with the exceptional circumstances doctrine. E.g., State v. Lopez, 873 P .2d 1127, 
1134 n.2 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The _addendum contains copies of the relevant provisions. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Cooper under the Serious Youth Offender Act with two counts of 
aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary, relying on a theory of accomplice 
liability 0.C.R. 2-3). The juvenile court found probable cause to bind over the charges, and 
transferred Cooper and the case to the adult court (R. 370-75;).C.R. 24-25, 28-31). 
Cooper and his parents retained substitute trial counsel and asked him to appeal from 
the juvenile court's order, as they wanted Cooper to stay in the juvenile court (R. 114, 118, 
122). Substitute trial counsel misinformed them that the time for appeal had run before he 
took the case, and he forfeited Cooper's appeal of right provided by § 78a-6-704 (R. 114, 
116-18, 123). Counsel advised Cooper to plead guilty to two second-degree-felonies in adult 
court, leading Cooper and his parents to share counsel's belief that Cooper could not go to 
prison ifhe performed flawlessly on probation (R. 116-117). On May 7, 2014, the court sent 
Cooper to prison on two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years (R. 8). 
In trying to keep Cooper safe, the warden first placed Cooper in solitary confinement 
in the portion of the prison housing death row inmates and dangerous mentally ill offenders 
(R. 114-115). He was left in his cell under camera surveillance for up to 72 hours straight, 
and was not allowed to see his parents (R. 114-115). He was later moved to the Daggett 
County Jail, approximately three hours away from his parents and counsel, where he was in 
direct contact with adult offenders (R. 224). Cooper maintained good behavior (R. 411 
n.17). 
4 
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Through present counsel, Cooper began filing post-sentence motions to reinstate his 
defaulted appeal from the juvenile court's Serious Youth Offender bindover order (R. 93-99, 
472-92), to vacate his sentence (R. 80-92, 219-227), to declare his pleas mispleas or nullify 
them (R. 110-112, 228-235), to quash the juvenile court bindover order (R. 414-456, 508-
524), and for a certificate of probable cause (R. 547-63, 576-85). The district court 
acknowledged Cooper's requests for evidenti.ary and oral argument hearings, and refused to 
have a hearing of any kind (R. 464-65). The court reinstated Cooper's direct appeal from the 
Serious Youth Offender bindover order, and denied all other relief (R. 586-98, 612-13). 
Cooper appealed(~ R. 545-46, 599-602, 618-623). 
The Board of Pardons paroled Cooper on November 6, 2014, and this Court 
dismissed Cooper's petition for a certificate of probable cause as moot on Cooper's motion. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Cooper Van Huizen was sixteen at the time of the crime, pleas and sentence W.. 20). 
He had no prior history of juvenile or adult offenses and lost approximately twenty-five 
pounds over the pendency of his case (R. 68-69). 
Cooper was the youngest of the defendants and next to the smallest defendant 
charged in the burglary and robberies. Cooper was 16 years 4 months old, 5'11" tall and 
weighed 150 pounds (R. 160). Wesley Brown was 18 years 10 months old, 6'2" tall, and 
weighed 217 pounds (R. 165-66). Dexter Skinner was 18 years 4 months old, 6' tall, and 
~ weighed 185 pounds (R. 163-64). Tomek Perkins was 18 years 9 months eighteen years old, 
5 
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5'6" tall, and weighed 120 pounds R. 162). Joshua Dutson was 17 years 2 months old, 6' tall, 
and weighed 160 pounds (R. 161). 
Prior to the crimes, Cooper was friends with Joshua Dutson and was acquainted with 
Dexter Skinner, but did not know Wesley Brown and Tomek Perkins (R. 293). Dexter 
Skinner had moved in with Joshua Dutson's family for about a month in approximately 
August of 2013, when Joshua's mother was trying to save Dexter from his troubled lifestyle 
(R. 326). Dexter called her "mom" and Joshua looked up to Dexter as a male role model 
and the older brother he had always wanted (R. 327). When Joshua became close to Dexter, 
Joshua became distant from his family, started sleeping more, and seemed less happy and 
energetic (R. 328). Joshua's mother asked Dexter to leave because he wanted to use illegal 
drugs and was doing the wrong things to earn money that he could not earn with a regular 
job (R. 327). Cooper was with Dexter and Joshua when he tried smoking marijuana the first 
time (R. 30). 
The day before the robbery,Joshua Dutson texted Cooper and infonned him he was 
''high" (R. 488). The agreedto "chill" the next day (R. 446). Joshua suggested they would go 
to Dexter's and smoke marijuana (R. 445-47). Joshua offered to pay for gas and asked if they 
would take his car, and Cooper said it depended on what his dad drives, and asked if Dexter 
had marijuana (R. 447). Joshua told Cooper that Dexter was "re-upping" the next day and 
asked Cooper what would happen if all that was left was the Mustang (R. 447). 
6 
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Then Joshua said, "Rob some niggas Hahahahah no what I'm saying? Want in you'll 
get a cut of it? hahahahah" (R. 44 7).1 Cooper responded, "Then we take that. But yeah I'll 
l.d do that for sure I just gotta get my gun back from Andrew." (R. 447). Joshua responded, 
''That's hella chill nigga but I was kidding." (R. 447). Then Joshua said, ''I'm mot." ''Not." 
(R. 448). Cooper responded, ''Not what? Ha ur confusing the shit outa me" (R. 448). 
Joshua responded, "Im high hahaHaha you can be apart of it but you gotta keep it on the 
down low .. an trust no nigga." (R. 448). Cooper responded, "About what? Robbing or 
~ driving the Mustang?" (R. 449). Then Cooper said, ''I know I'm not dumb ha haaha!" (R. 
449). 
Joshua was simultaneously scheming with Dexter Skinner in a separate text message 
conversation about Cooper wanting to participate in robbing, and Dexter responded, 
''Tomorrow we grab them straps and hit up niggas." (R. 448, 450). The "straps" to which 
Dexter referred were apparently Cooper's father's guns. 
A detective conceded that the actual robbery was planned by Wesley Brown the day 
after the text conversations, and that Wesley was not part of the text conversations (R. 307). 
Wesley Brown made the plan to rob Christian Davidson, as Wesley had lived with Christian 
in the past and knew Christian would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306).2 
1 Exhibit 1 is a truncated version of the text conversations admitted in the 
preliminary hearing, which began with the foregoing statement. 
2 The detective paraphrased Joshua Dutson's statement to the police, first indicating 
that "t:lie}flm¼ HuimdlyerpaompHmis~ps~3J3B.):sdmlt ~itl:Jepnlit:e~§l:fiml)til:~ 
that "they all basically made this plan," (R. 282). But when asked if Joshua said "they" made 
7 
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Cooper showed up on the day of the robbery without guns. Sometime after Tomek 
Perkins picked up and drove Cooper to join the group, they all went back to Cooper's home 
to get Cooper's father's guns (R. 288, 295). 
Christian Davidson testified that on the night of the robbery, he was in the basement 
with his friend Ryan Golding while his mother was upstairs (R. 246, 248). He was expecting 
friends and went to the back door when he heard a loud knock (R. 247). He said he opened 
the door slightly, and Dexter Skinner put his foot in the door, blocking Christian from 
closing it, and declared, ''We're coming in," or "Open the door or I'm going to pop 
[inaudible]." (R. 247,260). Christian claimed Dexter had a revolver out and was holding it 
by the side of his body (R. 247). 
Christian believed that Dexter came in with two other people (R. 247). Christian 
initially identified Cooper in court as the third person who came in with Wesley and Dexter 
(R. 253), and prior to the hearing had selected Cooper's photo from an array and told the 
police that Cooper was the one who held a gun pointed at the ground and took his wallet 
and phone off the counter during the robbery (R. 310). But later in the preliminary he~g, 
Christian was uncertain that Cooper was the third person (R. 257), and testified that he _did 
not see which person took his wallet and phone at Dexter's command (R. 254-56). 
The juvenile court found that Cooper did not carry a gun (R. 372). The police later 
confirmed that there were three people who came in with Dexter Skinner - Wesley Brown, 
the plan, the detective clarified that Joshua told the police that ''Wesley created the plan." (R. 
283). 
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Joshua Dutson, and Cooper, while Tomek Perkins was the getaway driver (R. 276). Joshua 
Dutson was the third gunman along with Dexter and Wesley, by Joshua's own admission (R. 
~ 284,289). The gun used by Joshua was a CO2 powered bb or pellet revolver that had the 
weight and appearance of a real gun (R. 302-03). The police believed Tomek Perkins 
provided Joshua's gun (R. 301-02). None of the guns was loaded (R. 284,296,662). 
Christian said that they entered against his will and went downstairs as he told them 
his mother was the only other person home (R. 248, 261 ). Christian said that Dexter put his 
pistol away when Ryan Golding came out of the laundry room, but that Dexter then lifted 
his shirt and showed Ryan the butt of his gun (R. 249-251). Ryan said, "Oh, that's neat," 
and reached toward the gun (R. 251 ). 
Christian then wamed him, ''Dude, you don't want to touch that." (R. 251). When 
Ryan asked why, Christian told him he never wanted to touch someone else's weapon (R. 
252). Christian said that Dexter chimed in, "'Yeah, man, his body is on this."' (R. 252). 
Christian said he got very nervous and scared after that, as "it really doesn't take one to 
know one if a gun's getting pulled out in anyone's home, it's really no two cents that lives 
may be in danger." (R. 252). 
Dexter pointed his gun, a large revolver, at Christian's face and someone told 
Christian to give him everything (R. 252-53).3 Christian hesitated and laughed, asking, 
"Seriously, over pot?" Wesley and the third person pulled out their revolvers (R. 252-53, 
3 Christian repeatedly testified in passive voice, and no one asked him to clarify. 
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59). Christian was told to lie on the floor, and he said there was a "little tiny bag of weed on 
the table. That's all I have." (R. 254). 
Dexter corrected him, ''No, you don't. I saw what you slipped in your pocket," and 
Christian then pulled a bag of marijuana out of his pocket (R. 254). Dexter asked if he had 
any money and Christian said he did not, although he had fifty dollars in his wallet, and 
Dexter told someone to grab Christian's wallet and phone but Christian did not see who 
took them (R. 254-56). Someone told him to lie still on the floor, and Wesley said he was 
going upstairs to pay Christian's mother a visit and the other two rushed upstairs and out the 
door (R. 255). Before Wesley went upstairs, Wesley complained of Christian's having 
awakened him with a metal pole on another occasion, and Christian told him he was fairly 
sure that Wesley had previously beaten up Christian the night his chin was broken open (R. 
255). Wesley pointed his gun at Christian for a second and hesitated, and Christian thought 
he was about to get shot (R. 255). But Wesley went upstairs quickly (R. 255). Christian 
commented to Ryan, ''Whoa dude, that was insane." (R. 256). About nine seconds later he 
heard the back door shut, and thought it was Wesley leaving (R. 256). 
After Christian's mother inquired at the school regarding Wesley Brown, the police 
were called, but Christian and Ryan hid from them in the back yard (R. 263-64). Ryan 
Golding did not testify, but his 1102 statement was read into the record. It stated, 
Early today my Christian and I were robbed at gunpoint. I was in the laundry 
- in his laundry room downstairs when a lot -- about five to six guys I had never 
seen before[4] came down, and one guy was show me a gun when - when another 
4 Ryan was actually able to identify Wesley because Christian and his mother knew 
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pulled his gun out and pointed it at all of us - or at us. He told us to get on the 
ground and to hand over our phones and money. I gave him the money in my wallet, 
and they proceeded to leave while threatening to kill us if we tried to stop him or tell 
anyone about it. 
(R. 264-65). 
A police officer testified that Joshua Dutson told the police that Wesley Brown 
·~ devised the plan to rob Christian of his marijuana and heroin and they all agreed to it before 
leaving the home in Ogden (R. 282-83, 288). Joshua said everyone had a role, and Joshua 
origioal1y claimed that Cooper had a gun during the robbery (R. 286). Then he said that 
Cooper supplied two real guns and a switchblade that he thought Cooper carried but did not 
pull out the during the robbery (R. 285). The juvenile court found that Cooper did not carry 
a gun and that there was insufficient evidence that he had a switchblade (R. 372). 
Joshua admitted to pulling the CO2 gun during the robbery, but he said he hdd it 
pointed toward the ground (R. 284). Joshua said they got seven grams of marijuana during 
the robbery and took it back to Ogden and smoked it before Tomek drove Cooper and the 
guns home and took Wesley back to the Two Rivers (alternative) High School (R. 288-89). 
The police went to Cooper's home, and Cooper and his father, Marc, were 
cooperative. Marc showed the police his safe, where the guns used by Dexter and Wesley 
were (R. 290-91). In Cooper's room, the police found a pellet gun that was not used in the 
robbery, foil that had been used to smoke marijuana, and a bottle of beer (R. 292). 
Wesley, and Ryan also recognized Dexter from when they had been in detention together (R. 
279). 
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In his police station interview, Cooper told essentially the same version of events as 
Joshua, except they differed about when Wesley went upstairs to see Christian's mother (R. 
294). Cooper said they were conversing with Christian when Dexter pulled the gun on him 
and told him they were robbing him of his marijuana, and that Wesley and Dexter held 
Christian and Ryan at gunpoint (R. 295). He denied seeing Joshua's gun, even after the 
police informed him that Joshua had admitted to using it (R. 295). Cooper refused to name 
Wesley Brown as a participant until the police told him everyone else had already named 
Wesley (R. 292). 
Cooper admitted that his father's guns were used in the robbery (R. 296). Cooper 
told the police that he took the guns with the understanding they were going target shooting 
(R. 295-96). He said that Dexter had texted him the morning of the robbery and invited him 
to hang out, and that Tomek picked up Cooper and took him to the house (R. 295). Dexter 
asked him if he wanted to go shooting in Morgan, and Cooper told him he had a couple of 
guns so they went to Cooper's house and got the guns (R. 295). When the detective asked 
about the gun that was missing a firing pin and did not work, Cooper said he was not aware 
of that when they took the guns (R. 296). 
Joshua's phone also contained text messages between him and Cooper the day after 
the robbery, wherein they joked about Joshua and the others committing another robbery 
(R. 271-72; Exhibit 1 ). An officer testified that on Cooper's phone, the police found texts 
that were consistent with those taken from Joshua's phone and a video of an unknown male 
lining up and snorting white powder (R. 266-67, 305). 
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After the juvenile court found probable cause that the crimes had been committed, in 
the retention portion of the Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing, evidence was 
presented that Joshua Dutson was involved with his mother in trading and acquiring Lortab 
and Valium, apparently outside of their prescriptions (R. 323-337). 
Cooper's parents both attested to Cooper's being a well-behaved, talented, 
hardworking and beloved child who had difficulty learning but still worked hard in school 
(R. 345-351, 353-54). His mother described Cooper's missing and falling behind in school, 
growing distant, and finding new friends who did not come around his parents after 
Cooper's best friend had moved away a few months prior to the robbery (R. 351-53). 
SUM1v.lARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
As Cooper has already served his prison sentence in the adult system, his appeal is 
focused on the juvenile court proceedings and defective bindover order, which failed to 
provide valid jurisdiction in the adult court. His goal in pursuing this appeal is to return to 
the juvenile court. 
Trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient, as counsel failed to inform the 
juvenile court about the 2013 amendments to the Serious Youth Offender statute, and failed 
to investigate, prepare for and advocate properly in Cooper's preliminary hearing. His 
omissions were not strategic. There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in 
the absence of counsel's objectively deficient performance. 
In addition to being at a disadvantage due to trial counsel's failure to advocate for 
Cooper, the juvenile court misinterpreted the Serious Youth Offender statute, by failing to 
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compare the culpability of the defendants and by holding Cooper accountable for the actions 
of the other defendants, rather than focusing on his role. The court apparently applied the 
outdated law that public safety is served by placing juveniles in the adult system, and focused 
on hypothetical possibilities common to most if not all Serious Youth Offender charges in 
assessing the public safety factor. The court did not independently weigh Cooper's lack of a 
prior weapons offense and Cooper's lack of any juvenile history. There is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence of these plain errors, to which counsel 
should have objected. Exceptional circumstances justify relief. 
The juvenile court judge should have disqualified herself from presiding over 
Cooper's case when she was married to the Chief Deputy over the Criminal Division of the 
Weber County Attorney's Office, which was prosecuting Cooper, and had formerly worked 
in that office in the same position as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor. This gave rise to 
the appearance of impropriety and requires reversal under numerous provisions of law. 
Individually and cumulatively, the errors justify an opinion reversing the bindover 
order, vacating the convictions and pleas, and remanding this case to the juvenile court. 
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I. 
ARGUMENTS 
Cooper Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel At The Serious Youth 
Offender Preliminary Hearing. 
A. Effective Assistance of Counsel is Essential in Serious Youth Offender 
Proceedings. 
Juveniles such as Cooper are entitled to effective assistance of counsel in Serious 
Youth Offender preliminary hearings. Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, ffll 38-40, 197 P.3d 
636. In State v. AngjlaIJ, 2011 UT 3, 245 P.3d 745, the court recognized that when juveniles 
are statutorily within the juvenile court's original jurisdiction, they have a liberty interest in 
remaining there. Id. at ,,r 13-19. Given that children prosecuted in adult court may be 
housed in adult facilities, life may also be at stake. See,~ Katz Levi, "State v. Mohl: State 
Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 174-76 and accompanying 
~ notes (2007) ( explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails endangers children, and 
increases the risk of suicide). When there is life or a liberty interest at stake, due process of 
law, guaranteed by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, requires courts to afford defendants the full 
panoply of procedural rights. Christiansen v. Harris, 1563 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). It is 
vital that counsel ensure that the juveniles' rights are fully effectuated and protected during 
Serious Youth Offender proceedings, so that the adversarial system functions properly and 
produces reliable results. See,~ United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,658 (1984) 
(discussing the basic role of counsel contemplated by the Sixth Amendment). 
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B. Counsel was Ineffective in Failing to Inform The Court About The 
2013 Amendments To The Serious Youth Offender Statute. 
By reviewing the enrolled copy of the bill embodying the 2013 amendments to the 
Serious Youth Offender Act, in the addendum, the Court will appreciate the significant 
changes in the law that were enacted shortly before Cooper's Serious Youth Offender 
preliminary hearing. Prior to the May 2013 amendments, our juvenile courts had very little 
discretion to retain minors under the Serious Youth Offender statute. Juveniles bore a 
"heavy burden" to overcome the presumption that they would transfer to the adult court, 
and had to show by clear and convincing evidence all of the retention factors: that they were 
less culpable than co-perpetrators, that their role in the offense was not violent, aggressive or 
premeditated, and that they had no prior delinquency involving a weapon that would have 
been a felony offense if an adult had committed it. E.g., § 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c) (2012); 
State v. F.L.R, 2006 UT App 294, ,I,I3 and 4, 141 P.3d 601. Importantly, the rationale 
behind the pre-2013 version of the Serious Youth Offender statute was that public safety 
was served by sending young offenders into the adult system, despite the fact that juveniles 
might benefit from the rehabilitative services of the juvenile court. M.E.P. v. State, 2005 UT 
App 227, ,r 14 n. 4, 114 P.3d 596; State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098-99 (Utah App. 
1997). Under the pre-2013 version of the statute, courts were not to consider whether 
juveniles were amenable to rehabilitation. See A.B., supra, at 1098. 
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Under the 2013 amended statute, juvenile courts have discretion to retain 
juveniles, based on an ultimate assessment of the juveniles' and the public's interest in 
the juveniles' remaining in juvenile court. Juveniles no longer bear the burden to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the subsidiary considerations -- that 
they had no prior weapons-related adjudications, that their relative culpability was 
lower than their co-perpetrators, and that their roles in the offenses were not violent, 
premeditated and aggressive. Rather, these factors are considered to the degree they 
may be present, along with the juveniles' prior history or lack thereof in the juvenile 
courts, and whether retaining them in juvenile court better serves the public safety 
interest than sending them into the adult system. See 78A-6-702(3) (2013). 
Considerations such as the juveniles' amenability to treatment, risk of re-offense, and 
availability of developmentally appropriate treatment in the juvenile system are now 
subject to consideration under the amended statute, which factors in whether the 
public's interest in safety and general interests and the minor's interests are best 
served by retaining the minors in juvenile court. 
The rationale for the amendments is found in the legislative history for House Bill 
105 from the 2013 general session. The history confinns that the statute was amended to 
increase the discretion of juvenile court judges to retain Serious Youth Offender juveniles, 
and to decrease the burden on juveniles in the retention phase of preliminary hearings, and 
thereby reduce the number of juveniles who were being transferred into the adult system 
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without first exhausting the resources of the juvenile system, in order to serve the best 
interests of both juveniles and the public. See 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id =2796&meta id =7 6536, 
(testimony of Jacey Skinner, Director of the Utah Sentencing Commission, before the House 
Standing Judiciary on February 22, 2013; 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id=2864&meta id=78203 (floor 
debate commentary by bill sponsor, Representative Lowry Snow); and 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id= 3146&meta id =85441 (floor 
debate commentary by Senator Lyle Hillyard), all transcribed in the addendum. The 
amendments were made to account for the fact that juveniles who are sent into the adult 
system are frequently released from adult confinement relatively quickly without 
rehabilitative intervention and resources, and tend to recidivate more frequently and more 
violently than those retained in the juvenile system. Thus, contrary to reasoning in prior law, 
~ M.E.P. and A.B., supra, the legislature recognized that public safety interests coincide 
with the juveniles' interests in retaining juveniles in the juvenile courts, where they have the 
benefits of rehabilitative services provided therein. See id. 5 
5 Multiple studies prove that transferring juveniles into the adult system disserves the 
interests of the public in safety and the interests of the minors. In the adult system, minors 
do not receive the benefits of the age-appropriate rehabilitative services available in juvenile 
court, and are often released early without effective intervention. This, coupled with the 
housing of impressionable and developing minors with adult offenders, and the stigmatizing 
effect of adult prosecution, results in increased recidivism, particularly violent recidivism, 
among juvenile offenders in the adult system, as compared to those who remain in the 
juvenile system. See,~ ''Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency" 
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Trial counsel did not assert the law and infonn the juvenile court that the 2013 
amendments to the Serious Youth Offender statutes were enacted expressly to ensure that 
1.1 more first time offenders such as Cooper would be retained in the juvenile court, as the 
public safety interest and interests of the juveniles are both served by retaining most 
juveniles who have not yet had the benefit of juvenile court resources in the juvenile court 
system. It was incumbent on counsel to research the change in the law and advocate for 
Cooper, ~ Strickland, supra, and it was objectively deficient for counsel to fail to advocate 
the amendments in the law on Cooper's behalf, compare Moritzsky, supra ( counsel's failure 
to assert amended law reflected in "pocket part'' to code book constituted ineffective 
assistance). There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the court been 
fully informed about the 2013 amendments to the Serious Youth Offender statute. 
C. Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Present Expert Testimony 
And/Or Studies And Law Justifying Cooper's Retention In The 
Juvenile System. 
In Houskeeper, supra, the court found that counsel was objectively deficient in failing 
to investigate and present expert testimony to the effect that the aggravated sexual assault 
by Richard Redding in the OJJDP bulletin (2008) 
Q:ittps://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1 / ojjdp/220595.pdf); "Different from Adults: An Updated 
Analysis of Juvenile Transfer and Blended Sentencing Law, With Recommendations for 
Reform" by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (Nov 2008) 
Q:ittp://www.ncjj.org/PDF/MFC/MFC Transfer 2008.pdf): "Transfer of Juveniles to 
Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court" by Edward Mulvey and Carol 
Schubert, OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin December 2012 
(http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/232932.pdf); and ''The Effectiveness of Declining Juvenile 
Court Jurisdiction," Washington State Institute for Public Policy, December 2013. 
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bound over from the preliminary hearing was not violent or aggressive, id, and that 
Houskeeper was prejudiced by this, given that the jury who heard the appropriate expert 
testimony at trial convicted him only of attempted rape. Id. at ,r,r 41-51. The court found 
prejudice even though Houskeeper did not challenge the fairness of the trial he had in adult 
court, wherein he was convicted of a lesser offense than he may have been found delinquent 
for in juvenile court. In finding prejudice, the court recognized that the juvenile court 
adjudications would have been subject to expungement, whereas the adult conviction was 
not, and that in the juvenile system, Houskeeper's best interests would have been the focus 
of the proceedings, and he would have been eligible for the rehabilitative services of the 
juvenile system. Id. 
Cooper's counsel similarly failed to prepare for the Serious Youth Offender 
proceedings, and prejudiced Cooper with this objectively deficient perfonnance. Under the 
2013 amended statute, the retention inquiry was defined by subsections (3)(b) and (c) of 
78A-6-702. 
As Cooper had no prior weapons-related offenses and no prior adjudications in the 
juvenile court, both of these factors should have weighed separately and heavily in favor of 
his retention. See §78A-6-702(3)(i) and (iv) (2013). 
As to whether public safety was better served by retaining Cooper in the juvenile 
system, see §78A-6-702(3)(v) (2013), counsel did not present any expert testimony to aid the 
juvenile court judge in assessing Cooper's stage of development, intellectual and emotional 
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functioning, relative lack of culpability and relatively unpremeditated role in the offense, low 
risk of re-offense, and amenability to reform in the juvenile system. 
~ The results of psychological testing conducted by Dr. Matt Davies after Cooper was 
sent to prison and then transferred to the Daggett County Jail reflect that Cooper scores as 
naive and unsophisticated, a rule follower, rather than a rule breaker, lacking a history of 
impulsive or aggressive behavior, and appropriately empathetic and responsive to others' 
feelings (R. 410). His test scores place him at a low risk for aggressive or violent behavior 
4P (R. 410). He has no elevated scores as are commonly seen with adolescents with problems 
with violence, aggression, and non-compliance (R. 410). His testing shows no mental illness, 
although he may be delayed in his ability to identify and express his feelings consistently (R. 
410). 
He recognized the need to make amends for his criminal behavior, understood the 
impact of his and his co-perpetrators' conduct on the victims, and wished that the crimes 
had never happened (R. 411). The evaluation explained that because of Cooper's age and 
possible mild developmental immaturity, he did not have a completely developed capacity to 
think through and anticipate consequences of his own actions (R. 412). In discussing the 
crime during the evaluation, Cooper's viewpoint was that he did not plan it, and when he 
found out what Wesley and Dexter planned to do, he knew it was wrong but did not know 
what to do (R. 411). While Cooper recognized in hindsight that he could have derailed the 
crime, his test data suggested that at the time of the offense, he did not have the emotional 
wherewithal to intercede (R. 412-413). The evaluation noted studies showing that regions of 
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the brain necessary to cognitive control are not yet developed in adolescents, and that social 
context heavily influences decision-making in adolescents, who are more prone to take risks 
to gain peer approval (R. 412 and n.21). 
The evaluation addressed Cooper's and the public safety interest in his retention in 
the juvenile court, explaining that juveniles incarcerated with adults are more likely to be 
physically and sexually abused while incarcerated, a higher incidence of mental illness, and 
are 7. 7 times more likely to commit suicide than juveniles held in juvenile facilities. When 
released from adult facilities, such juveniles have significantly increased rate of recidivism. 
(R. 412). The evaluation concluded that if he were returned to the juvenile justice system, 
Cooper would benefit from the resources available there, and could grow intellectually, 
emotionally and physically in that less stressful environment (R. 413). 
With regard to relative culpability, see §78A-6-702(3)(ii) (2013), counsel did not 
provide the court the recent law recognizing that children are less culpable and deserve 
greater leniency, because their brains are biologically underdeveloped and do not function 
well when it comes to making decisions and gauging the impact of their actions.6 Nor did 
counsel inform the court through expert testimony or other means as to the deleterious 
effects of marijuana on adolescent brains and decision-making. 7 
6 E.g. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 
837-40 (1988) (plurality); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 
S.Ct. 2455. 
7 See,~ National Institute on Drug Abuse, ''DrugFacts: Marijuana," found at 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana (''These effects include 
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With regard to the public's interest in his remaining in the juvenile system, see §78A-
6-702(3)(v) (2013), counsel presented no information to the court regarding the risks posed 
lJ to minors in the adult system, and the effects of adult prosecution on their recidivism. Utah 
does not comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act standards designed to protect minors 
housed in adult facilities from sexual assault (R. 224-225). See 
http://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea final rule.pd£. page 6. According to the findings 
entered by Congress in conjunction with the enactment of PREA, juveniles housed in adult 
facilities are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted than those housed in juvenile 
facilities, often within the first forty-eight hours of being incarcerated. "Public Law 108-79, 
September 4, 2003," Office of]uvenile and Delinquen~ Pro!fams, United States Department of 
Justice, September 4, 2003, found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
108publ79/PLAY-108publ79.pdf. Federal Prison Rape reporting law statistics show that the 
Utah state prison has ranked among the least safe for inmates nationwide.8 There have been 
altered perceptions and mood, hnpaired coordination, difficulty with thinking and problem 
solving, and disrupted learning and memory. Marijuana also effects brain development, and 
when it is used heavily by young people, its effects on thinking and memory may last a long 
time or even be permanent."); Gottlieb, "Cannabis: A Danger to the Adolescent Brain -
How Pediatricians Can Address Marijuana Use," found at 
http: //www.mcpap.com/pdf / Cannibis.pdf, 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/metto/26886186-418/even-casual-marijuana-use-can-
alter-the-brain-new-study-shows.httnl#. U Sj8zo 1 dVU8. 
8 In 2007, the Utah State Prison was listed among the eleven facilities wherein the 
highest percentages of inmates experienced nonconsensual sexual contact, see Table 5 in 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf). Current statistics on the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act are not specific to each state, but are grim, showing that 9.6 percent of 
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multiple homicides and other stabbings that have occurred at both Utah State Prisons.9 And 
as Dr. Davies indicated in his evaluation, juveniles who are housed with adults are 7. 7 more 
likely than those housed with juveniles to commit suicide, and that juveniles housed with 
adults also have much higher rates of recidivism and physical and sexual abuse than juvenile 
offenders housed with juveniles. E.g. R. 412. 
The warden's well-intended solution of placing juvenile prison inmates in solitary 
confinement has adverse side effects such as increased rates of suicide and psychosis, 
particularly for juvenile offenders. See, ~ "Alone and Afraid: Children Housed in Solitary 
Confinement and Isolation in Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities," Gune 2014), 
(https:/ /www.aclu.org/ files/ assets/ Alone%20and%20Afraid%20COMPLETE%20FINAL. 
pdf). 
The foregoing information was key to the court's accurate assessment of the 
retention factors. Counsel's failure to investigate and present the key evidence was 
objectively deficient, not strategic. There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result in the absence of counsel's omissions. 
incarcerated people were sexually assaulted in our country's jails and prisons in 2012, that 7.5 
percent of prison inmates were molested, whereas 1.8 percent of jail inmates were, and that 
the rate of sexual assaults in prisons has increased from 4.8 percent to 7.5 percent. See 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca12.pd£ 
9 See, ~ Salt Lake Tribune, "Investigators Identify Utah Prison Inmates Involved in 
Fatal Fight," (detailing homicide of one inmate by another); Salt Lake Tribune,June 25, 
2014, "Inmate Stabbed in Gang Fight at Utah State Prison," (detailing stabbings of two 
inmates). 
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D. Counsel Was Ineffective With Regard To The Evidence Pertaining To 
The Crimes. 
Counsel omitted other evidence showing that Cooper was relatively less culpable and 
that therefore his and the public's interests would be served by his remaining in juvenile 
VJ) court. In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated the ages of the codefendants and 
argued that they were all of similar age and experience, and were operating as a peer group, 
rather than as adults influencing the younger codefendants (R. 363). Counsel for Cooper 
presented no evidence or argument to point out that Cooper is the youngest defendant, 
smaller than all but one other defendant, and has no criminal history (R. 160-66). Nor did 
v.) counsel note that the oldest two, Wesley Brown and Dexter Skinner, had multiple felony 
cases pending (161-73). 
When the detective testified about Cooper's interrogation and told the judge that 
Cooper initially omitted Wesley Brown from his description of the robbery but later agreed 
to tell the truth (R. 292-93), counsel should have elicited the key fact missing from this 
testimony - that Cooper wanted the police to agree to protect him before he was willing to 
acknowledge Wesley Brown's participation (R. 427). Counsel should have introduced the 
recording of or testimony concerning Dexter Skinner's comments during his arrest and in 
his interrogation expressing his shock and regret that the sixteen-year-olds were getting 
arrested, and that Cooper, a good kid, had been involved (R. 427). 
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Counsel should have carefully compared the behavior of all the co-perpetrators for 
the court, see Point II.A., infra, and reminded the court of the law recognizing that it is not 
appropriate to attribute the misconduct of co-perpetrators to juvenile accomplices in 
assessing the relative culpability of the juveniles or the extent to which the minor's role in 
the offense was violent, aggressive and premeditated. See, ~ State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 
318, 79 P.3d 951, infra. 
As to the violence and aggression factors, counsel did not challenge Christian 
Davidson's claim that the robbery was a home invasion robbery. Ryan told the police that 
Christian let the people in (R. 239), and swore that it was after one of them was showing 
Ryan his gun that the robbery began (R. 191). After the robbery, Golding counseled 
Christian, "Stop bringing sketchy people over to your house," (R. 185), language that belies 
the home invasion claim. Christian's mother made no claim of a forced entry or home 
invasion when she conveyed Christian's allegations to the police (R. 17 4-78). Every 
defendant who confessed to the anned robbery described the entry into the home as a 
consensual entry (e.g. R. 24, 27, 189, 237-38). For instance, in his 1102 statement,Joshua 
said that they went into the home of Wes's "buddy, Christian," and that it was after they 
were inside that Dexter pulled his gun (R. 286). Counsel could have subpoenaed and called 
these witnesses or presented their statements to the police had they refused to testify. 
Christian was the only person who made claims to the effect that the robbery began 
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with a forced entry. His claims about the supposed forced entry were inconsistent 10 He 
testified that it was only after Dexter pulled out his gun in the basement that he got very 
ti@ nervous and scared (R. 252). His sworn statement to the police describes him participating 
in an amicable conversation about the propriety of touching another man's gun that 
occurred in the basement before the robbery began, and acknowledges that he was laughing 
and incredulous when the robbery over marijuana began (R. 184). Counsel should have 
cross-examined Christian about the inconsistencies and about how Christian's forced entry 
vi claims may well have arisen from his need to engender sympathy with the police to minimize 
his own criminal jeopardy for his drug dealing (R. 180-82). He asked his mother not to 
report the robbery to the police for fear that he and his friends would be investigated for his 
involvement in illegal drugs (R. 185). In addition to the false claim of a forced entry, 
Davidson told the police his wallet contained fifty dollars (R. 185), in contrast to originally 
10 In his November 8, 2013, sworn typed "Roy City Police Department Statement of 
Witness," Davidson claimed that he heard the knocking, unlocked the door, and looked out 
the blind to see Dexter Skinner with his gun barrel visible, threatening to "bust a cap" if 
Christian did not let him in. But Christian also claimed that the door was ajar and Dexter 
v) had his foot in it, blocking Christian from closing it. R. 183-85. If the door had been ajar, 
there would have been no need for the Dexter to knock or Christian to unlock the door. 
In his separate handwritten sworn ''Roy City Written Statement'' from November 4, 
2013, Christian claimed that he heard a knock, looked through the door, saw the barrel of a 
gun and heard a light skinned black man say, "Open the door or I'll pop this cap." Christian 
,,:;J said he opened the door and was told to go downstairs. But he made no claim of trying to 
close the door or the man sticking his foot in the door. R. 186-87. 
In his testimony at the preliminary hearing, Davidson claimed that he opened the 
door after hearing a loud knock at which point Dexter Skinner was ·holding a gun by his side 
and someone said they were coming in, and someone put their foot in the door (R. 24 7). 
vJ Then he testified that he opened the door slightly, at which point someone put a foot in the 
door and threatened to pop [.inaudible] (R. 261). 
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telling his mother there was no cash in it (R. 17 4). By exaggerating his claims of victimhood, 
he may have hoped to deflect blame from himsel£ 11 
Counsel's failure to challenge Christian's home invasion claim was a highly prejudicial 
omission, for the juvenile court characterized this robbery as a forced entry home invasion 
robbery, and found that the forced entry and home invasion aspects of the robbery were 
aggravating in her assessment of the public interest in having Cooper transferred to the adult 
court (R. 195-96). 
Counsel was ineffective in failing to oppose inadmissible hearsay evidence. Serious 
Youth Offender preliminary hearings are unique and focus not only on probable cause, but 
also on retention in the juvenile court. They are presided over by juvenile court judges, not 
magistrates. See, ~ M.C. v. State, supra, 916 P.2d at 917-918 (discussing why juvenile court 
judges presiding over SYO hearings are not considered magistrates functioning under rule of 
criminal procedure 7). While hearsay is admissible as to issues of probable cause, Utah R. 
Juv. P. 22G), in the retention portion of the hearings, the minor defendants have the right to 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, Utah R. Juv. P. 23A(e). 
Much of the most damaging evidence at the hearing was hearsay as to Cooper, whose 
Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing was held jointly with Joshua Dutson's with the 
assent of Cooper's counsel. Some of the hearsay came from co-defendants and others who 
11 People in trouble with the law often inculpate others to detract from their own 
liability. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1999); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123, 126-28 (1968); and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,545 (1986). 
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were in deep trouble with the law themselves, and had the resultant need to curry favor with 
the police and prosecuting authorities by inculpating others. As a result of the bias that is 
~ engendered in such situations, their statements were unreliable as a matter of law. See, ~ 
T ,my, Bruton and Lee, supra. Counsel should have objected to the joint preliminary hearings, 
see Utah R. Juv. P. 28, and objected to the hearsay, particularly that from constitutionally 
unreliable witnesses, or called them as witnesses to cross-examine them. 
For instance, Detective Barker testified without objection that there were multiple 
robberies that day, wherein the five suspects had robbed multiple victims of cologne, a 
leather jacket, and marijuana, supposedly in Ogden, North Ogden, Harrisville, and Roy (R. 
285-86). The rules of evidence generally apply in juvenile court. See Utah R. Juv. P. 43. 
The assertions regarding the other robberies qualified as hearsay that was not admissible to 
show probable cause for the crimes at issue in this preliminary hearing, and should have 
been excluded under Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 23A(e), supra, and Utah Rule of 
Evidence 802. See Utah Rule of Evidence 801 (c)(1) and (2) (defining hearsay as a statement 
made by the declarant outside of court and admitted by a party to prove the truth of the 
assertion in the statement); Rule 802 (excluding hearsay). Under Utah Rules of Evidence 
401 through 404, before such evidence of extrinsic crimes was admitted, the Government 
should have shown a proper non-character purpose for the evidence, which should have 
been relevant to a material fact, and the probative value of the evidence should not have 
been exceeded by its potential for prejudice. See,~-, State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). Evidence of the other crimes was not admitted for any 
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proper non-character purpose, was not relevant to any material fact, and was highly 
prejudicial to Cooper. Trial counsel did not object or clarify that only Dexter Skinner and 
Wesley Brown were charged in other robberies (R. 167-73), and that Cooper was not. 
The detective summarized Joshua's allegations about the charged robbery, wherein 
Joshua initially claimed that Cooper had a gun during the robbery, and then said Cooper had 
a switchblade (R. 284). He also read Joshua Dotson's 1102 statement into the record to the 
effect that they all agreed on Wesley's plan before leaving the house in Ogden to go to 
Christian Davidson's, without any hearsay objection from juvenile trial counsel for Cooper 
(R. 282-89). Given Joshua's motive to exculpate himself by inculpating others, counsel 
should have raised an objection to this unreliable hearsay. E.g." Tj1Jy, Lee and Bruton, supra. 
Counsel's fundamental failures to investigate, research and prepare Cooper's 
retention case are not properly characterized as strategy. Trial lawyers cannot make valid 
strategic decisions absent reasonably necessary and thorough investigation of the facts and 
the law. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690. 
As is detailed further in Point II, there is a reasonable probability that Cooper would 
have remained in the juvenile court had the court been properly informed by the 
presentation of a thorough and appropriate retention case. Particularly when the evidence 
and law discussed above that were omitted by counsel are compared to the information that 
was presented at the Serious Youth Offender hearing (summarized in the statement of facts), 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had counsel properly investigated 
and presented Cooper's case for retention. Cf. Houskeeper, supra. This is particularly so 
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because the adult court's jurisdiction to preside over Cooper's case, to take his pleas, and to 
sentence him to prison were all dependent on the defective bindover in this Serious Youth 
~ Offender case. E.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 78a-6-702; M.C. v. State, 916 P.2d 914, 915-917 
(Utah App. 1996) (recognizing that orders transferring minors to adult court are final and 
appealable as they end juvenile court jurisdiction and initiate adult court jurisdiction). 
II. The Juvenile Court Misinterpreted the Amended Serious Youth Offender Statute. 
The court's assessment of the retention factors was repeatedly skewed against 
Cooper by the court's misinterpretation of the statute. 
A. Cooper's Relative Culpability Was the Lowest Among the Defendants'. 
All Serious Youth Offender cases by definition involve violent crimes, and thus, 
courts must compare the relative culpability of the participants to detennine whether a child 
should be retained in the protective confines of the juvenile court. See State v. Lara, 2003 
UT App 318, ,I 29, 79 P.3d 951, supra. Under 78A-6-702(c)(tl) (2013), because there were 
multiple perpetrators, the court should have assessed whether Cooper appeared "to have a 
greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants." 
The court found Cooper's culpability significant, but did not articulate the culpability 
of the defendants other than Cooper for purposes of comparison and did not actually find 
vJ whether Cooper had a greater or lesser degree of culpability in comparison to all the others 
involved in the crime. The court's final order stated: 
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4. These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court 
therefore considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other 
co-defendants, and finds that his culpability was significant. 
a. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than 
others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife 
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and 
assisted in the forced entrance into the home with the co-defendants. 
b. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies. 
Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen 
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies. 
c. Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other co-
defendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the 
persons therein. 
(R. 195). 
Without carefully comparing Cooper's culpability to the co-defendants', the court was 
in no position to make a meaningful assessment of whether Cooper should remain in 
juvenile court. Review of the record confinns that the relative culpability factor should have 
weighed in favor of his being retained in juvenile court. Cooper was the youngest and 
second smallest of the codefendants, the oldest of whom, Wesley Brown and Dexter 
Skinner, had multiple felony cases pending (e.g. R. 167-69; R. 170-72). Dexter Skinner had 
schemed by text messages with Joshua Dutson the day before the robbery to "grab them 
straps" (Cooper's father's guns) and rob some people, while, in a separate text message 
conversation wherein Joshua claimed to be "high" and appeared to be joking, Joshua invited 
Cooper to rob some people (R. 295-96, 450). The next day, after Cooper was driven to 
Skinner by Tomek Perkins and did not bring the guns, Skinner and the others took Cooper 
back to his father's house to retrieve the guns before the robbery that Wesley had planned 
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the day after the text conversation (R. 295-96, 450). Christian Davidson identified Skinner 
as the person who had his gun out by his side when the robbers forced their way into the 
home, and who threatened to pop or bust a cap (fire a shot) if Christian did not let them in 
(R. 247-49, 251253, 260,261). During the robbery that followed the conversation in the 
basement about Dexter's or Wesley's gun having bodies on it (people who had been killed 
buy it), Christian said that Dexter Skinner was the first one to point his gun at Christian and 
demand his property, and also demanded the other bag of marijuana he had seen Christian 
put in his pocket before the robbery began (R. 248, 251-52). Skinner asked for Christian's 
money and directed one of his cohorts to take Davidson's wallet and phone (R. 254). 
Inasmuch as Christian originally indicated during the photo array that it was the third 
gunman who took his wallet and phone (R. 310), and then was unsure that Cooper was this 
person (R. 257), it appears that Joshua Dutson, who admitted to being the third gunman (R. 
284,289), was the person who took Christian's wallet and phone. 
Wesley Brown had previously lived in the home where the robbery occurred, knew 
there would be drugs there, and planned the robbery (R. 248-49). He pulled a gun during 
the robbery and pointed it at Christian Davidson while discussing Brown's displeasure at 
Christian's having awakened him with a pipe in a past incident (R. 255). Wesley went 
upstairs to pay an armed visit to Davidson's mother, who had previously taken Wesley in to 
live there until he bragged of killing a man in Louisiana and she asked him to leave (R. 174, 
VP 282-83, 294). 
Tomek Perkins provided the real-looking airsoft gun used by Joshua during the 
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robbery (R. 301-02). He brought Cooper to Skinner's house the morning of the robbery, 
drove everyone to Cooper's to retrieve his father's guns, and was the getaway driver for the 
robbery (R. 283, 288). 
Joshua Dutson was a juvenile whose phone records documented his dealing and 
using illegal drugs with multiple people (R. 267, 329-337). The day before the robbery, when 
Cooper texted him and asked him to "chill," Joshua suggested they go to Dexter's and 
smoke marijuana (R. 445-47). While claiming to be high,Joshua invited Cooper to 
participate in robbing people as if it were a joke, while simultaneously scheming with Dexter 
Skinner in a separate text message conversation about inviting Cooper to participate in 
robbing people, grabbing "them straps" (Cooper's father's guns), and robbing people the 
next day (R. 295-96, 450). Joshua pulled and held the real-looking airsoft gun pointed at the 
ground during the robbery (R. 247). 
According to the preliminary hearing evidence, Cooper provided two of the three 
guns, none of which were loaded and one of which was broken, and was present and passive 
during the robbery (R. 284, 296). Cooper jokingly agreed to participate in robbing 
unspecified people during the text conversation the day before (R. 447-449), but the actual 
robbery was planned the next day by Wesley Brown, who knew Christian Davidson would 
have drugs. Cooper did not know Wesley or Tomek or Christian before the day of the 
robbery (R. 293). 
The court made no mention of the facts that Cooper was the youngest and second to 
the smallest defendant and the least developmentally equipped to be making good decisions, 
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given his youth, who was further impaired by his marijuana use.12 The court did not require 
an evaluation of Cooper prior to sending him to adult court. Had the court done so, 
evidence was readily available that Cooper was developmentally susceptible to peer pressure, 
given his level of maturity and development. An evaluation would have confirmed that 
Cooper's relative culpability was the lowest among the defendants involved in the robbery. 
See Dr. Davies' evaluation (R. 406). 
B. Cooper's Role in the Offense was Not Violent or Aggressive And Was 
Not Highly Premeditated. 
All crimes in Serious Youth Offender cases are violent, aggressive and intentional and 
Vii thus premeditated to a degree, and thus courts must focus on the role of the individual child 
and consider the extent to which the role was violent, aggressive or premeditated in 
determining whether to retain them in juvenile court. E.g. Lara, s,pra. In the court's ruling 
on the extent to which Cooper's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive or 
premeditated manner, the court repeatedly attributed the violent and aggressive actions of 
others to Cooper because he provided the guns they used. The court ruled: 
5. Mr. Van Huizen's role in the offense was committed in a violent aggressive, 
or premeditated manner. 
a. These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The 
guns belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in 
the burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not 
a spur of the moment decision. 
b. Mr. Van Huizen was with co-defendants who forced their way at gun point 
into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home. 
12 See, ~ R. 406 (Dr. Davies' evaluation) and n. 7, s,pra. 
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c. The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's 
planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen knew that the guns were intended to be 
used in a burglary and robbery for drugs. 
cl. Mr. Van Huizen's presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the 
victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home. 
(R. 195-96). 
The evidence showed that Cooper's role in the offense was not violent or aggressive. 
There was no testimony that he was one of the people who showed a gun prior to entering 
the house, put his foot in the door or told Davidson he had to let them in and to go 
downstairs. The court found that Cooper did not brandish any weapon during the entire 
offense (R. 195). There is no evidence that he threatened anyone in any way. While Cooper 
was present, his liability for the offenses was accomplice liability. Even under the more 
severe pre-2013 version of the Serious Youth Offender law, the court should have focused 
on Cooper's actual role during the offense in assessing his level of violence, aggression and 
premeditation, rather than holding him accountable for the violent and aggressive actions of 
his co-perpetrators. See State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,r 28, 79 P.3d 951. 
In Lara, the Court reversed the juvenile court's application of the statute in finding 
that Lara had acted in a violent and aggressive way, because instead of focusing on Lara's 
actual individual role, the court "focused on the actions of the other participants." ,r 28. 
The Court recognized that all offenses eligible for prosecution under the Serious Youth 
Offender statute are by nature violent, and that if a transfer order could be premised on the 
violent nature of the offenses charged, rather than on the basis of a comparison of the 
juvenile's behavior vis-a-vis his co-perpetrators, all SYO defendants would be transferred to 
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the adult court. Id. at ,r 29. The Court also reversed the juvenile court's reasoning that Lara 
was equally culpable with his co-perpetrators unless he could show no involvement in the 
~ crime. Id. at ,r 29. The Court explained that if the juvenile were not involved in the crime, 
he would not have been charged, and that "the relevant inquiry is whether the juvenile is less 
blameworthy than the codefendants because he was not the initiator or driving force behind 
the crime, did not use a weapon or threaten the victim, or otherwise played a less active role 
in the crime." Id. Because Lara had stayed in the back seat of the car while his co-
perpetrators perpetrated the robbery and assault, and only drove the victim's car away, the 
Court found that he had carried his burden to show that his role in the offense involved less 
culpability than that of his co-perpetrators. Id The Court noted that the State had 
presented no fonn of conspiracy or aiding such as encouragement. Id. at ,I 30. 
As to premeditation, the Court found that Lara's participation was incidental, not 
premeditated, because the co-perpetrators approached the victim, robbed her of her keys at 
gunpoint, had her kneel outside her car, looked in the car and then went and talked to Lara 
and gave him gave the keys, before Lara walked from the car he was in and got in the 
victim's truck and drove away, stopping to pick up a co-perpetrator. Id. at ,r,J 32-33. The 
Court ruled that the facts showed that the other robbers decided that Lara would drive the 
stolen truck when they realized it had a standard transmission they could not drive, and that 
his role in the aggravated robbery was spontaneous, not premeditated. Id. The State 
~ petitioned for review of the reinstatement of the appeal on certiorari, and the Utah Supreme 
Court affinned this Court's opinion. State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 124 P.3d 243. 
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As for premeditation, the court ruled that there were several steps in this robbery, 
and that Cooper could have extricated himself from it before it occurred (R. 374). A 
psychological evaluation would have provided important information regarding this factor as 
well, for Cooper's adolescent brain was biologically less able to anticipate the consequences 
of his actions, and that he was not equipped to extricate himself from the robbery despite 
knowing it was wrong. E.g. R. 406, supra. While Joshua Dutson told the police that 
everyone was aware of the plan that Wesley created, there was no evidence presented that 
Cooper was involved in the actual planning of the robbery of Christian Davidson and Ryan 
Golding. The text message conversation between Joshua and Skinner shows that they were 
scheming to get Cooper's father's guns the night before when Joshua invited Cooper to 
participate in a separate text message conversation (R. 295-96, 450), and Wesley Brown 
planned the robbery of Davidson, as he had previously lived in that home with him and 
knew he would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306). Thus, the premeditation was primarily done by 
the older, more sophisticated defendants and Cooper's role was less premeditated. 
C. The Public Safety Interest Called For Cooper's Retention in the 
Juvenile Court 
The court ruled that public safety was better served by transferring Cooper to the 
adult court, reasoning: 
a. Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited until 
the age of 21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited. 
b. The involvement of drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a home 
to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our community. 
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c. The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case. 
People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when 
they occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead 
to even fatal hann to law enforcement and other members of the public. 
d. Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period than 
is available in the juvenile court. 
e. The defense provided evidence of a loving family and good home. The 
court finds that will help the Defendant in tenns of his long term rehabilitation, but it 
also works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to 
engage in violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public 
at grave risk 
(R. 196). 
From its ruling on public safety, it appears that the juvenile court relied on the old 
law such as A.B. and M.E.P., to the effect that public safety is served by transferring minors 
to the adult system where lengthier sentences are available, and was not aware of the 2013 
Serious Youth Offender amendments and their intent or that retaining Serious Youth 
Offender minors in the juvenile system serves the public safety interest By giving juveniles 
the many benefits available in the juvenile system, courts serve the public interest in security 
by refonning juveniles into law-abiding members of society. In contrast, by sending 
\j) juveniles to the adult system, courts disserve the interest of public safety, because these 
children who are placed in the adult facilities and system may well be melded into 
accomplished criminals and will not be adequately supervised and refonned before they are 
released and recidivate. See Point IB, supra. 
The court's public safety analysis largely turned on the serious nature of the offenses 
charged, and the potential volatility and hypothetical threats they can pose to perpetrators, 
the police and the public, given that others may respond violently to such crimes (R. 196). 
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This general and hypothetical approach would ostensibly lead to transfer in all Serious Youth 
Offender cases, which by nature involve violent crimes that can prompt violent responses 
and pose threats to law enforcement and members of the public.13 The court's belief that 
the crimes charged here are among the most serious in our community similarly did not take 
into account the range of offenses subject to retention under the Serious Youth Offender 
statute. The statute contemplates that retention in juvenile court may be appropriate for 
even more serious offenses involving intended and actual, rather than potential, serious 
injuries or intended death to the victims. In characterizing the crime as a dangerous breach 
of the sanctity of the home, the court did not recognize that aggravated burglaries and 
robberies are among the crimes that routinely result in Serious Youth Offender prosecutions 
under the statute, and that those minors who commit such offenses are nonetheless subject 
to retention in the juvenile court pursuant to the plain terms of§ 78a-6-702 (2013). 
Nor did the court account for the facts that the guns were not loaded, and that the 
robbery began after an amicable conversation that even Christian Davidson acknowledged 
occurred in the basement before the robbery (R. 184), countering the notion of a home 
invasion robbery. 
13 The Serious Youth Offender Act applies to aggravated arson, aggravated assault 
with serious bodily injury, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, 
aggravated sexual assault, felony discharge of a firearm, attempted aggravated murder, 
attempted murder, and felony-level weapons offenses committed by juveniles with prior 
convictions of that type. 
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The court held it against Cooper that he came from a loving family and good home, 
because he chose to commit the crimes despite his fortunate upbringing (R. 196). The court 
i.diJ did not consider Cooper's biological lack of development to make good choices, and that 
Cooper's upbringing and complete lack of juvenile history demonstrated that the robbery 
was a significant aberration from his law-abiding life which suggested that his caring parents 
would successfully aid him in reforming during the five years he could remain in the juvenile 
system if he were retained. The court concluded that Cooper needed a longer correctional 
period than the five years the juvenile system could provide, despite his complete absence of 
prior history and his good home, and his relatively minor and nonviolent role in the crime. 
The court may well have ruled differently had the court been made aware of the basis for the 
amendments to the Serious Youth Offender Act - to ensure that first time offenders such as 
Cooper are rehabilitated in juvenile court, rather than criminalized, stigmatized and released 
relatively quickly without treatment from the adult system, to recidivate more violently in the 
future. See Point IB, supra. 
In assessing the public's safety interest in Cooper's being prosecuted in adult or 
juvenile court, the court did not require an evaluation of Cooper by a psychologist, and 
assumed from the facts of this one case that there was a great likelihood of further injury and 
harm. Had the court required or received a professional evaluation, the court could have 
had a solid evidentiary basis for assessing the low risk of future hann posed by Cooper, his 
amenability to refonn, and the public safety interest in keeping Cooper in the juvenile 
system. See Davies evaluation. 
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D. Cooper Lacked a Qualifying Prior Weapon-Related Offense And Had 
No Prior Offenses. 
With regard to factors one and four, the court ruled twice that Cooper had no prior 
record in the juvenile court, without separately recognizing one of the actual statutory 
criteria: that he had no prior weapons-related offense that would have been a felony had he 
committed one (R 194, 196), see § 78A-6-702(c)(i), supra. This is important because it 
demonstrates the egregious type of juvenile history that might normally justify transferring a 
minor into the adult court, which Cooper did not have. 
Cooper's complete lack of a prior history in juvenile court should have weighed 
heavily in favor of retention. See legislative history of 2013 amendments, in the addendum. 
E. Cooper's Interest in Remaining in Juvenile Court Was High. 
Without articulating this aspect of the ruling in any fashion, the court found by clear 
and convincing evidence that it was not in Cooper's best interest to be prosecuted in adult 
court (R. 197). The court should have expressly considered the refonnative benefits 
available to Cooper in juvenile court, in contrast to the risks posed to and hanns that befall 
minors such as Cooper when they go into the adult system, discussed above. 
As detailed in Point I, the juvenile court was disadvantaged in her assessment of the 
actual facts of Cooper's retention case, because Cooper's counsel did not investigate and 
present the relevant law and evidence. Because counsel did not properly assert the facts and 
law on Cooper's behalf, or object to the court's errors discussed above, if necessary, this 
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Court may reach the merits of Cooper's claims through the doctrine of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Criminal defense lawyers are required to investigate and assert both the facts and 
lj the law on their clients' behalf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Trial lawyers must properly 
preserve all issues. See,~ State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at ,I 10, 67 P.3d 1005. When 
counsel fail to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes objectively deficient 
performance, which will not be excused by the courts for hypothetical tactical reasons. See, 
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989). 
The court's failure to compare Cooper's culpability to that of his co-perpetrators, 
holding Cooper accountable for his codefendant's behavior in the assessment of the nature 
of Cooper's role in the offense, hypothetical assessment of the public safety interest, and 
failure to separately recognize that he had no prior weapons offense constitute obvious 
error, based on the plain language of the Serious Youth Offender statute and the controlling 
case law interpretjng similar language in the predecessor statute, ~ Lara, supra. Counsel 
should have objected to the errors and was objectively deficient in failing to do so. 
As there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the court been fully 
apprised of the relevant evidence and law, and had the court followed the law, Cooper has 
proved prejudice to justify relief under both the plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrines. See Verde, supra. 
Given the significant changes in the law in the 2013 amendments shortly before 
Cooper's preliminary hearing, of which the lower court and parties were apparently not 
aware, the Court may correct the errors resulting from deviation from the 2013 amendments 
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with the exceptional circumstances doctrine. E.g., State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 n.2 
(Utah 1994) (allowing state constitutional claim for first time on certiorari under this 
doctrine, because law had changed during pendency of the case). 
III. The Juvenile Court Judge Should Have Disqualified Herself. 
''Nothing is more damaging to the public confidence in the legal system than the 
appearance of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 
278 (Utah 1989).14 "The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected 
against any taint of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest 
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 
523 (Utah 1948).15 
Cooper's juvenile court judge who presided over Cooper's case and signed the order 
delivering him to the adult court is married to the Chief Deputy over the Criminal Division 
of the Weber County Attorney's Office that was prosecuting Cooper (R. 504-05). In addition 
14 In Gardner, the trial judge did not recuse after an affidavit of bias was filed 
premised on the fact that the trial judge worked in the same courthouse as the murder and 
other crimes at issue at trial had occurred. The supreme court found that any error 
stemming from any appearance of bias was harmless because Gardner did not show actual 
prejudice or a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Id. at 278.-
15 In Haslam, the court ruled that a judge is disqualified if actually biased and 
prejudiced, which the court defined: ''Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill 
will toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism toward one." Id. at 523. 
The court found no such bias or prejudice in the allegations that the judge had previously 
presided in a case involving the petitioner, had found his testimony incredible, and had 
interrupted his testimony. Id. at 525. 
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to being married to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of the prosecuting attorney's 
office, the juvenile court judge fonnerly worked in the same office as her husband, as a 
(,zi}i Deputy Weber County Attorney juvenile court prosecutor representing the State - in the 
same position as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor (R. 504-05). The juvenile court judge 
did not disqualify herself, notify counsel for the parties, Cooper, or his parents of these facts, 
or obtain their consent to preside. When Cooper and his parents learned of these facts, they 
averred that had they known them before, they would have requested that Cooper's life-
altering juvenile court case be presided over by someone who was not tied to Cooper's 
prosecution (R. 428, 657, 659-662). 
At a minimum, these facts created the appearance of impropriety. Compare Smith v. 
Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. 1984). In holding that a judge's marriage to a deputy district 
attorney assigned to juvenile court matters required his disqualification in an adult court case 
involving the district attorney's office, wherein the wife did not participate, the Beckman 
court explained, 
The circumstances here are such that an appearance of impropriety is created 
by the close nature of the marriage relationship. A husband and wife generally 
conduct their personal and financial affairs as a partnership. In addition to living 
together, a husband and wife are also perceived to share confidences regarding their 
personal lives and employment situations. Generally, the public views married people 
as "a couple," as "a partnership," and as participants in a relationship more intimate 
than any other kind of relationship between individuals. In our view the existence of 
a marriage relationship between a judge and a deputy district attorney in the same 
county is sufficient to establish grounds for disqualification, even though no other 
facts call into question the judge's impartiality. Therefore, we hold that Judge 
Beckman should have granted the motion and disqualified himself. 
: Id. at 1216. 
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If only to uphold the appearance of justice and to avoid the appearance of bias, the 
judge in Cooper's case should have disqualified hersel£ Cf. id. Our state case law recognizes 
that impartial judges are not just key to individual cases, but are also critical to the reputation 
of the judiciary. Utah historically has encouraged judges to scrupulously protect the integrity 
of the judiciary by recusing themselves when there is even a colorable claim of bias. See, 
Haslam v. Morrison, supra-, and State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah),16 cert. denied, 
497 U.S. 1220 (1988). Similarly, the preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes 
the key role judges play in our nation's justice system, and the concomitant need for judges 
to conduct themselves with the impartiality and integrity essential to fostering public 
confidence in the judicial system. The first canon of the code and Rule 1.2 of that canon 
require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and to maintain and 
foster the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 2 and rule 2.2 require judges to 
perform their duties with impartiality and fairness. Rule 2.3 requires judges to proceed 
without bias or prejudice. Judges are to ensure that family interests and relationships do not 
influence their performance or judgment. See Rule 2.4(B). 
Rule 2.11 requires judges to disqualify themselves if their impartiality might reasonably 
16 In Neeley. the court found that there was no abuse of discretion or actual bias 
involved in a trial judge's refusing to recuse himself based on his previously having signed 
criminal informations and previously having been present for the defendant's pleading guilty 
in cases some twenty years prior. Id. at 1094. This Court affirmed in State v.Jonas, 793 
P.2d 902 (Utah App. 1990), on similar facts, wherein the same trial judge was the district 
attorney in multiple prior prosecutions, and dismissed one case against the defendant when 
acting as prosecutor. Id. at 910. 
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be questioned, including instances wherein they have a bias or prejudice toward a party, a 
party's lawyer, or if their spouse is "officer, director, general partner, managing member, or 
trustee of a party[.]" As the rule tacitly recognizes, the judge's marriage to the Chief 
Criminal Deputy of the office prosecuting Cooper gives rise to bias or prejudice toward the 
party's lawyer. And the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of the prosecution office 
prosecuting Cooper is properly considered an officer, director or managing member of a 
party, and an attorney of the party if not the party itself. Cf. Regional Sales Agency v. 
Reichert, 830 P.2d 252,255 n.1 (Utah 1992) (finding that judge's relatives, who were equity 
partners in a law firm representing a party on appeal fell within the statutory definition and 
required disqualification of the appellate judge who was married to and related to the equity 
partners, and noting split of authority regarding whether attorneys are included in the tenn 
"parties" in similar statutes). 
While there was no evidentiary hearing to explore the involvement of the judge's 
husband in Cooper's case, the record reflects that after Cooper went to prison, he was 
involved in Cooper's case as the prosecutor originally designated by Weber County Attorney 
to deal with present counsel for Cooper in her efforts to obtain discovery and settle the case 
(R. 523). The record also reflects that on May 21, 2014, after present counsel began 
challenging Cooper's convictions, the judge's husband ordered a recording of one of the 
hearings and a copy of the final commitment (R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14). The fact 
that the judge's husband was involved in this case at least at the adult court level after the 
bindover adds to the impropriety and appearance of impropriety resulting from the judge's 
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presiding over the hearing that delivered Cooper into the adult system. Cf. Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration 2.11(A)(6)(a) (requiring disqualification if the judge "was associated 
with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such 
association[.]"). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-222 provides: 
(1) Except by consent of all parties, a justice, judge, or justice court judge may 
not sit or act in any action or proceeding: 
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested; 
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity 
within the third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law; 
or 
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action 
or proceeding. 
As noted in Reichert, supra, the term "party'' in similar statutes may be interpreted to include 
the attorneys for the parties, such as Cooper's judge's husband. Thus subsection (l)(b) 
required the court to obtain the parties' consent before presiding further. With regard to 
subsection (1)(c), while a judge may preside in a case involving a party previously represented 
in a separate matter by the judge or the judge's prior firm,17 this is a fact-dependent issue that 
requires consideration of various factors. 
These factors could include, inter alia, whether the judge continues to have a financial 
interest in the firm, whether the judge has maintained close personal relationships 
with members of that firm, whether a family member of the judge works for the finn, 
whether the judge had significant involvement with the client while a member of the 
17 Utah R. Professional Conduct 1.0(d) defines the term "firm" in terms broad 
enough to encompass governmental offices. 
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furn, or whether the judge's association with the £inn is particularly recent. See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78-7-1(1); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1); see also ABA 
Comm. on Professional Ethics & Grievances, Infonnal Op. 594 (October 22, 1962) 
(listing some factors that would make disqualification appropriate in case involving 
judge's fonner £inn." 
In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Utah 1997).18 By analogy, particularly because 
her husband still worked for the office prosecuting Cooper, the judge's prior representation 
of the State in the same position as Cooper's prosecutor counseled in favor of 
disqualification under the statute. See id. 
The service of a "competent person ... authorized by law to detennine the questions" is 
the first element of due process guaranteed by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution in cases 
involving life or liberty, Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314,317 (Utah 1945), such as this. 
The service of an impartial judge is recognized as so essential to the proper functiorri,ng of a 
criminal trial that the absence of an impartial judge constitutes structural error under federal 
constitutional law. See,~ Arizona v. Fuhninante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-310 (1991) (structural 
errors are those which undennine the fundamental integrity of criminal trials, and which are 
so pervasive as to defy harmless error analysis). Under the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution, issues of judicial bias are assessed from an objective perspective, 
and proof of actual bias is not required to justify relief. See Caperton v. A.C. Massey, Inc., 
18 This opinion is solely that of then-Chief Justice Zimmerman. See id. at 1153. 
While it does not represent a majority opinion, it has been cited with approval in several of 
..o Utah appellate opinions. E.g., Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,I 49, 2015 UT LEXIS 51; 
Spafford v. Granite Credit Union, 2011 Ut App 401, 1J 41, 266 P .3d 866. 
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556 U.S. 868 (2009).19 If an average judge, who is influenced by human weaknesses and 
normal psychological tendencies, on the facts at issue would likely be neutral, then the judge 
may continue presiding. On the other hand, if there is an impermissible risk of prejudgment 
or actual bias or temptation leading away from balanced judging, Due Process does not 
permit the judge to continue on the case. See id. 
The risk of bias in a case such as this, wherein the judge was asked to sign the order 
sending a minor into the adult criminal system by the prosecutorial office wherein her 
husband was the Chief Deputy over the Criminal Division, and wherein the judge had 
previously worked in the same role as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor, violated due 
process under the Caperton standard. The average person in such circumstances would be 
tempted away from balanced judging, and prejudgment and actual bias may have been 
present as well. Cf. id. 
Judges are presumed to be qualified, and the fact that a judge ruled against a party is 
not in itself evidence of bias. In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153-54 (Utah 1997). 
To obtain relief on appeal, a party must normally show actual bias or an abuse of discretion. 
See Neeley, 1094-95. Actual bias is defined as "undue friendship or favoritism" toward a 
party. Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948); In re Young, 984 P.2d 997, 1007 
(Utah 1999). Relief is also required if the defendant proves that his substantial rights were 
19 In Caperton. the Court held that a supreme court justice's failure to recuse himself 
from an appeal from a fifty million dollar verdict when the principal officer of the company 
appealing that verdict had contributed more than three million dollars to the justice's 
campaign violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
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affected by showing a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the judge recused 
herself. State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 611-612 (Utah App. 1997). If the judge, as opposed 
~ to the jury, is the ultimate factfinder, the likelihood of prejudice from erroneous service of 
the judge is greater. Cf. State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201,204 (Utah App. 1992).20 
The judge's marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy of the Weber County Attorney's 
office and prior service as a juvenile court prosecutor representing the State, the same party 
prosecuting Cooper, required the court to recuse herself under Rule 2.11(2)(a) and§ 78A-2-
222(b) and (c). As the Beckman court recognized, spouses are reasonably expected to 
operate as a partnership. Cooper's judge's ti.es to the prosecution give rise to the reasonable 
inference that she felt favoritism toward a party, and meet the definition of actual bias. See 
In re Young. An objective view of the situation recognizes that there would be an 
"impermissible risk of prejudgment or actual bias or temptation leading away from balanced 
judging" for a judge in this circumstance, requiring disqualification under the Due Process 
standard. See Caperton, supra. This structural, constitutional, statutory, common law and 
rule violation requires reversal of the bindover order, even if it is viewed solely as giving rise 
to the appearance of impropriety. Compare Reiche~ supra. 
While Beckman is not binding in Utah, the remainder of the foregoing law requiring 
the judge to disqualify herself was controlling prior to Cooper's preliminary hearing. The 
court's failure to comply with the law constitutes obvious error. As detailed above, under 
20 In Ontiveros, a challenge was brought because the murder at issue was committed 
shortly after judge had released Ontiveros on another case. This Court ruled there was no 
prejudice because there was no actual bias and the jury decided the case. 
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the 2013 amended Serious Youth Offender statute, Cooper should have been retained in the 
juvenile court. Particularly because there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result 
had a different judge presided, Cooper has proved prejudice from the judge's failure to 
recuse herself, and has justified relief under Alonzo and the plain error doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
The individual and cumulative effect of the foregoing errors justifies an opinion 
reversing the bindover order, vacating Cooper's convictions and pleas, and remanding the 
case to the juvenile court. See Lara, supra. 
Respectfully submitted on April 1, 2015. 
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:~ 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER ON BIND OVER 
vs. 
COOPER VAN HUIZEN, 
Defendant. 
Case Nwnber: 100344 7 
Judge: Michelle E Heward 
This matter came before the court for a preliminary hearing/examination and a 
subsequent best interest hearing, on December 20, 2013. The State was present and represented 
by Brody E. Flint, I)eputy Weber County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented 
by his attorney, . Rex Bray; co-defendant Josh Parley Dutson was present and represented by 
counsel, Mary Ann Ellis. The Court heard evidence from all parties and being fully apprised, 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The State met its burden and the court finds probable cause to believe that the 
criIµes listed in ·the Information, two aggravated robberies and one aggravated burglary, occurred 
as alleged. 
2. Further, there is probable cause to believe that Cooper Van Huizen committed the 
offenses alleged in the Information. 
3. The Defendant has no prior record in the juvenile court. 
FILED 
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4. These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court therefore 
considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other co-defendants, and 
finds that his culpability was significant. 
a. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than 
others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife 
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and assisted 
in the forced entrance into the home with co-defendants. 
b. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies. 
Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen 
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies. 
c. Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other co-
defendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the persons 
therein. 
S. Mr. Van Huizen's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or 
premeditated manner. 
a. These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The 
guns belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in the 
burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not ~ spur 
of the moment decision. 
b. Mr. Van Huizen was with co-defendants who forced their way at gun 
point into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home. 
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c. The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's 
planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen knew that the guns were intended to be used 
in a burglary and robbery for drugs. 
d. Mr. Van Huizen' s presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the 
victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home. 
6. This is Mr. Van Huizen's first offense injuvenile court. 
7. Public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the district court. 
a. Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited 
until the age of21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited. 
b. The involvement of drugs, violence, :firearms, and forcing entry into a 
home to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our 
community. 
c. The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case. 
People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when they 
occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead to even 
fatal harm to law enforcement and other members of the public. 
d. Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period 
than is available in the juvenile court. 
e. The defense provided evidence of a loving family and good home. The 
court finds that will help the Defendant in terms of his long tenn rehabilitation, but it also 
works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to engage in 
violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public at grave risk. 
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.; 
8. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the 
best interest of the Defendant to bind him over to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
9. The defense has not shown, however, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is 
in the best interest of the public for this case to be adjudicated in juvenile court. The court finds 
that it is contrary to the best interests of the public to allow the case to remain in juvenile court. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER 
The Defendant should be and hereby is bound over to the district court for further 
proceedings on the Information. An arrest warrant has issued and bail has been set. 
DATED thisL clay of January, 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
~ .. 
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1 interest of the public to bind the defendants over to the 
2 juri sdiction of the district court. 
3 The Court wants to make sure that I'm making a record 
4 that is clear for both of the defendants individually and not 
5 placing them together. Counsel, I'll ask if there are any 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
questions with regard to the findings as I go through here that 
you ask questions if I'm not clear- with regard to each of your 
clients and to the State's interest so that I can make sure that 
that record is clear, and I ' ll attempt to do that. 
The Court has considered the five statutory factors that 
are set forth in 78A-6-702(3) (c). The first of those factors by 
stipulation has been found to go in favor of each of the 
defendants. Neither one of them have prior records here in the 
juvenile court that are of any significance here. 
15 The second factor is whethe~ the offenses were committed 
16 with one or more persons -- I'm sorry, these offenses were 
17 committed with one or more persons, so the Court considers 
18 whether each of the minor's involvement, whether each of them 
19 had a greater or lesser degree of culpability than their co-
20 defendants. 
21 With regard to Mr. JPD, the Court finds that his role 
22 in carrying out the offenses was one of planning and pulling 
23 
24 
25 
people together. The evidence before the Court shows that the 
culpability of Mr. JPD both before and during the actual offense 
shows that he had culpability. 
! i 
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1 He was involved in acquiring guns prior 
2 with the knowledge that they would be used in the robbery. He 
3 was in a place to use those weapons to gain entry. I'm sorry, 
4 he was in on the plan to use the weapons to gain entry into the 
5 home, and to take what he and his co-defendants wanted from the 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
people within the home. 
While the Court does not find that he poi nted a gun at 
either of the victims -- I'm just not sure what happened there --
but I do find that .that was done by two of - the - - the two adults 
that were involved. Mr. JPD's involvement had a high degree of 
culpability in insuring that that would happen, that t he people 
that he was with would pull guns and use t hem after breaking int o 
the home. 
Wi th regard to Mr. CVH, the Court finds that his 
involvement was less in terms of hi s physical involvement at the 
scene. I don't have evidence that he brandished a gun, and I 
have insufficient evidence to determine whether he had a 
switch -- the switchblade that had been referred to by others 
that have test i fied he r e today. 
His involvement was in planning and facilitating , the 
of fenses. His i nvolvement was actually greater than that of 
Mr. JPD's. These were his guns from his home, and this was wel l 
planned out in terms of how the guns would be used. So in terms 
of the second factor, the Court finds that the invol vement of 
each of the each of these defendants was significant in terms 
_; 
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1 of the offenses. 
2 Whether the role - - the third factor as the extent of 
3 the minor's role in -- was •it committed in a violent, aggressive 
4 or premeditated manner . The premeditation in these offenses has 
5 been already been referred to by the Court. This was not a 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
spur of the moment, a dumb or a childish decision, a quick 
reaction. Both defendants were involved in planning the 
robberies and the burglary. 
There were multiple steps that were carried out prior to 
actually going out to the home. This took place over a period of 
time, giving both of the defendants ample opportunity to retract 
themselves from the offenses, but they chose not to do so. These 
were violent and aggressive offenses with the use of guns and 
threats , going inside one of the most protected and sacred places 
in our society, the home. 
The violence that was employed, albeit by others in 
terms of pulling the guns, was made possible by Mr. CVH and 
facilitated by Mr. JPD. In addition to providing the guns by 
19 Mr. CVH and the planning or pulling together of the parties and 
20 facilitation by Mr. JPD, they both -- both of these defendants 
21 forced their way into a home with the assistance of friends 
22 that they were with who were using guns, and their physical 
23 presence -- I'm talking about the defendant's physical presence 
24 
25 
was a threat when the offense took place. The Court finds that 
the roles of both JPD and CVH to have been involved involved 
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violence, aggression and were premeditated. 
The nwnber and nature -- the next factor is the nwnber 
and nature of prior adjudications in the juvenile court. The 
4 Court finds that those again go in favor of the defendants here. 
5 They do not have violent -- or they do not have records of any 
6 significance here in the juvenile court. 
7 The fifth factor is whether public safety is better 
8 served by adjudicating the minors in the juvenile court or in the 
9 district court. The Court believes that public safety would be 
·10 better served in both of these cases by adjudicating them in the 
11 district court. 
12 They are older juveniles, 16 and 17- years of age. 
13 The extent of the juvenile court's involvement is limited until 
14 
15 
the age is limited to the age of 21. The district court's 
jurisdiction is not limited. While these were first offenses, 
16 the involvement of drugs, violence, particularly the use of 
17 firearms and forcibly entering into a home where people therein 
18 were robbed places the offense amongst the most serious in our 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
cornrnuni ty. The like_lihood of further injury and harm is great 
when given the facts of this case . Society deserves to be 
strongly protected against this activity. 
The Court does find that the defense has shown that it 
is contrary to the best interest of the minors t o bind them over 
to the jurisdiction of the district court. There are more 
rehabilitative services that are available in the juvenile system 
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1 than in the adult system. Both of the minors, both of the 
2 defendants appear to have loving families and homes that they 
3 have come from. They have had opportunities in the past to 
4 succeed, and they have skill sets that show that they have many 
5 capabilities. They chose not to use those. Either the support 
6 nor the positive skill sets that I think both of them have, they 
7 chose not to use those in. this situation. 
8 So the Court finds that the defense has not met its 
9 burden of proving that it is contrary to the best interest of the 
10 minor and the best interest of the public to bind the defendants 
11 over to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Let me make sure 
12 that I 've said that right. While the defense has met the burden 
13 of proving it is contrary to the minor's best interest, neither 
14 defense has met its burden of showing that it's in the best 
15 interest of the public in this inter in this instance, and the · 
16 matter is bound over to the district court. 
17 On a personal note, this is not the way that I woul d 
18 want any young man to start his majority with serious offenses 
19 in the adult system. It's tough to be held accountable for 
20 
21 
your actions, but I also think that it's necessary that 
accountability is necessary. You still both have a lot of years 
22 in front of you, and it is the Court's hope that you use this 
23 experience to do -- make better decisions and choices in the 
2 4 future as you move forward . 
25 That being said, I need arrest warrants here. Does the 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OMNIBUS RULING AND STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
POST-SENTENCE MOTIONs\UG 2 9 2014 
vs. Case No. 1319025.li-a(?. _________ _ 
t=ILED COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN 
HUIZEN. 
Judge Ernie W. Jor es 
I AIJG29m 1 
Defendant. SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant, s several post-sentence 
motions. In order, Defendant has presented the Court with the following motions: 
1) the "Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed illegally as a Result of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel"; 2) the "Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious 
Youth Offender Bindover Order''; 3) the "Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify 
Pleas"; 4) the ''Motion to Quash Bindover Order from Juvenile Court"; and 5) a 
"Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal" combined with an "Application for 
Certificate of Probable Cause." Counsel for both the State and Defendant have 
1JD fully briefed these motions and the Court has carefully considered the arguments 
and law cited therein. In the interest of judicial efficiency, and as these motions 
touch on similar themes and legal questions, the Court will address these motions 
in this single omnibus ruling and order. 
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BACKGROUND 
Defendant, following his participation in a violent home invasion, was 
charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated 
burglary. Defendant, a 16-year-old minor, was then bound over fromjuvenile court 
to this Court to face the charges as an adult. The bind over process was conducted 
in accordance with the Juvenile Court Act, specifically its provisions relating to 
serious youth offenders See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. In March of this year, 
Defendant entered guilty pleas to two reduced, second-degree felony robbery 
charges. On May 7, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 1- to 15-
year terms in the Utah State Prison. 
Defendant, by raising several alleged deficiencies, now seeks to challenge 
~e pl"Ocess by which Defendant was bound over into di~tiict court from juvenile 
court; entered his plea of guilty, and a sentence was imposed. In deciding these 
motions, the Court will address each motion according to its chronological relation 
t<? Defendant's proceedings, rather than in the order that Defendant filed the 
motion with the Court. Following the Court's analysis and ruling, the Court will 
specify its respective orders. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Motion to Quash Bind Over Order from Juvenile Court 
First, the Court addresses Defendant's motion to quash the bind over order 
from juvenile court. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by several alleged 
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legal and structural errors that occurred during the process by which the juvenile 
court bound him over to this Court. The statutory mechanisms establishing this 
· bind over process are outlined below. 
The Juvenile Court Act, specifically in its provisions relating to transferring 
serious you~ offenders to district court, provides that juveniles may be bound over 
· and held to answer to as adults in district court if the criminal information filed 
against those juveniles charges them with certain types of violent offenses. See 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. This process is not automatic and is subject to the 
state meeting its burden to establish probable cause that that the violent offense has 
been committed and that the juvenile defendant committed said violent offense. 
· Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3). If the state met this burden, the juvenile court 
"shall order that the defendant be bound over [to the district court] ... unless the 
juvenile court judge finds that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor 
and to the public .... " Id. 
The factors that a juvenile court judge may rely upon in making the 
determination to bind over the defendant are very specific, and the Juvenile Court 
~ Act provides that a juvenile defendant may appeal a bind over order. See Utah 
Code Ann. 78A-6-702(3)(c), 78A-6-704(a). On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals 
then reviews the bind over order and the ''underlying factual findings made by the 
juvenile judge" for "clear error'' in order to determine whether to affirm or reverse 
the bind over order. State ex rel. M.E.P ., 114 P .3d 596, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
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This process illustrates that it is only the appellate court that is vested with 
the authority to consider and potentially quash juvenile bind over orders. 
· Defendant has offered sundry arguments as to why this Court should quash the 
bind over order, but such arguments to this Court are unavailing, as it possesses no 
jurisdiction to issue the particular relief sought. Only the app~llate court may 
consider these arguments and order the bind over order quashed if that court 
determines that such action is appropriate. For lack of jurisdiction, this Court 
cannot grant such a motion. 
Il. Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover 
Order 
The Court now turns to Defendant's motion to reinstate the timeframe to 
appeal the bind over order. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the failure 
of then-serving counsel to timely file an appeal of the bind over order and the 
failure of same counsel to inform Defendant of the availability of such an appeal. 
Defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Manning in support of the 
proposition that it is appropriate to reinstate appellate time when appeals of right 
are defaulted by counsel and through no fault of the defendant. See State v. 
Manning. 122 P.3d 628,636 (Utah 2005). The State agreed in its opposing 
m~morandum that under Manning, Defendant should have his time to appeal the 
bind over order reinstated. 
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Manning provides that it is appropriate to reinstate a Defendant's direct 
appeal right.if it can be determined that the defendant "been prevented in some 
meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of right." Id. at 635. One of 
the outlined circumstances of Manning leading to reinstatement of the direct appeal 
right is that the defendant can demonstrate that ''the court or the defendant's 
attorney failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal." Id. While the 
State points out that the juvenile court bind over order clearly specified the 30-day 
right to appeal that order, Defendant maintains that his counsel neither informed 
the Defendant of this fact nor provided the Defendant with a copy of the bind over 
~ order. 
Normally a gUilty plea, such as Defendant's here, would serve as a waiver of 
any alleged procedural defects with the bind over. See State v. Rhinehart, 167 P.3d 
1046, 1049 (Utah 2007). However, our Supreme Court has specified that this 
waiver does apply to alleged errors of a jurisdictional nature. Id. Here, had 
Defendant timely appealed the bind over order, he would have been challenging 
the decision of the juvenile court to confer jurisdiction over the Defendant to this 
~ Court. This question, combined with the fact that Defendant has offered evidence 
supporting the application of the Manning circumstances (namely that counsel 
failed to advise Defendant of his right to appeal and failed to provide him with the 
juvenile court order specifying the available relief) leads the Court to conclude that 
reinstating Defendant's time to appeal the bind over order is appropriate. 
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The Court, however, must stress that granting Defendant's motion here does 
not affect Defendant's present incarceration, as the Court's decision cannot unwind 
all proceedings post-bind over order. When this Court heard the case, accepted the 
plea, and announced a sentence, it did so with the understanding that it held-proper 
jurisdiction via bind over order. Barring ~ appellate court decision as to the 
validity of that bind over order and its effect on this Court's sentence, the Court 
lacks the authority to stay the sentence in conjunction with reinstating the time to 
appeal the bind over order. The appropriate procedural mechanism to stay a 
sentence pending appeal is found in Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. As mentioned in the outset of this ruling, Defendant has made a motion 
invoking that rule, and the Court will address the merits of that motion later in this 
ruling. 
·m. Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify Pleas 
Next the Court addresses Defendant's motion that this Court recognize 
Defendant's guilty pleas as mispleas or alternatively to nullify those guilty pleas. 
Defendant asserts that this Court retains the authority to declare a misplea here or 
to nullify his pleas because the guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary~ While 
it is true that a trial court may withdraw a plea of guilty upon a showing that the 
plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made, such motions must be made prior to 
the announcement of sentence~ Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)( a)-(b ). Any 
\' 
! 
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challenge to a guilty plea ''not made within the [specified] time period" can only be 
pursued via request for post-conviction relief. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)( c ). 
Here, the Court has announced its sentence regarding the Defendant's 
conviction. Accordingly, the Court possesses neither the authority to hear such a 
motion nor the ability to grant the requested remedy. Defendant's arguments 
regarding knowledge, volition, and their relation to his guilty pleas may only be 
offered in a separate, civil petition for post-conviction relief. The Court therefore 
cannot grant this motion. 
IV. Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed IDegally as a Result of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant also moves this Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22( e ), to correct Defendant's sentence on the basis that the sentence was 
'<iP illegal. In support of this motion, Defendant offers that the sentence was illegal 
due to trial counsel's ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, 
Defendant argues that the assistance was ineffective because trial counsel failed at 
the sentencing hearing to distinguish Defendant's culpability from that of his co-
defendants', and failed to provide the Court (for purposes of presentence reporting) 
with information that Defendant alleges was essential to consider. -Despite 
Defendant's strenuous argument, ineffective assistance of counsel does not serve 
as grounds for declaring a sentence illegal. 
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Regarding illegal sentences, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 
definition promulgated by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. State v. Yazzie, 203 
P.3d 984,988 (Utah 2009). Under that definition, a sentence is illegal if it "is 
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is 
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain 8:8 to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment 
of conviction did not authorize." United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 
(10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the State points out, a 
sentence is also illegal if the imposing court lacks subject matter jwisdiction. State 
v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 854,857 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
As the Court cannot consider Defendant's arguments of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a proper basis for declaring the sentence here illegal, it 
must determine whether the any of the aforementioned, recognized grounds apply. 
The Court determines that they do not. Defendant pied guilty to two counts of 
robbery. Robbery is classified under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 as a second-
degree felony. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203, the appropriate 
sentence that may be levied against a person convicted of a second degree felony is 
an indeterminate term of imprisonment "not less than one year nor more than 1 S 
years." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(2). Defendant's sentence here was not 
ambiguous with resp~ct to time or manner. It was not internally contradictory. It 
did not omit a required term imposed by statute. It was not uncertain as to the 
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' substance of the sentence. It was precisely the sort of sentence authorized by the 
conviction of a second-degree felony .. As previously established, the Court had 
jurisdiction subsequent to the issuance of the bind over order from juvenile court. 
None of the established grounds that would render a sentence illegal and require 
correction under Rule 22( e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exist here. 
Accordingly, the Court can find no basis to properly grant Defendant's motion. 
V. Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal and Issue a Certificate of 
Probable Cause 
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant's petition for a certificate of probable 
cause motion to his Motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. In order to release 
a currently incarcerated defendant during the pendency of his appeal, Rule 27 of 
the Utah Rule of Criminal-Procedure requires that that this Court first issue a 
~ certificate of probable cause and determine by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant is not likely to flee and does not pose a danger to the 90mmunity. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b)(l). In order to properly issue a certificate of probable 
cause, the Court must find that the Defendant's appeal is not taken for the purpose 
of delay and raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in 
reversal. Id. at (b )(3 ). 
Out of the myriad arguments Defendant has made, the Court has recognized 
vlD only one as cognizant: that the Defendant may appeal the juvenile Court bind over 
order due to the failure of trial counsel to apprise him of his right to appeal the 
.·.59 If t , . 
' \ .. 
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order. However, this Court is not convinced by Defendant's arguments that it is 
reasonably likely that the Court of Appeals will quash the bind over order. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the clearly delineated jurisprudence that informs the 
Court's analysis of Defendant's other motions, the Court is not convinced that 
Defendant~ raised any substantial issues of law and fact that make it reasonably 
likely that the Court of Appeals will overturn the Court's other determinations. 
Specifically as to the bind over order, Defendant's argument challenges the 
juvenile court judge's qualifications to hear his case and only collaterally attacks 
the juvenile court's consideration of the five factors that must be analyzed when 
deciding to bind over a defendant to district court. As stated previously, the 
statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-6-702(3)( c) require that juvenile 
court judges only consider five specific factors when making bind over 
determinations. Nothing in Defendant's arguments suggests that the juvenile court 
deviated from those factors and none of Defendant's proffered alternative 
conclusions to each of those factors is legally or factually significant enough to call 
the court's decision into question. 
Furthermore, this Court is not convinced that Defendant's arguments 
regarding the juvenile court judge (specifically her personal and professional 
background) raise an issue of fact or law significant enough to make reversal of the 
bind over reasonably certain. As the Court can find no adequate ground on this 
issue, or as to the arguments supporting Defendant's other post-sentence motions, 
,.·- ~; 0 ~ 
. vV• .. 
: r.:,~ 
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,~ 
that would warrant the issuance of a certificate of probable-cause, the Court will 
refrain from issuing such a certificate. 
Even if the Court were to find a basis to issue the certificate of probable 
cause, the circumstances forming the basis of Defendant's conviction demonstrate 
that it is not in the community's best interest to release him from incarceration. 
The Defendant is serving his current sentence because he pied guilty to robbery-a 
robbery accomplished through home invasion and through Defendant's provision 
of firearms. These are actions and the sort of behavior that can only be 
characterized as absolutely contrary to the societal interests of peace and safety. 
Defendant's age does not mitigate the gravity of these actions. Indeed, the 
severity of his behavior warranted charging him in district court as an adult It 
would be antithetical to the interests-even safety-of the community to suspend 
the operation of his sentence. Absent grounds to issue a certificate of probable 
cause, and in light of the circumstances of the offense, the Court is not convinced 
that it is appropriate to release defendant from- incarceration. 
ORDER 
On the basis of the foregoing rulings, Defendant's Motion to Reinstate 
Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover Order is GRANTED. All other 
motions captioned and discussed herein are hereby DENIED. In accordance with 
granting Defendant's Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth 
Bindover Order, the 30-day period to appeal the bind over order is reinstated. 
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Pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, any such appeal of 
that bind over order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of this Order. 
Dated this 2 ~ day of A ~, ~,T2014. 
. \ 
~ont{~..,,,,--
Utah Second District Court 
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~~CATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the i'!f.. day of A,J 2014, I sent a true and con:ect 
copy of the foregoing ruling to the p~es as follows: 
Dee W. Smith · 
Brody E. Flint 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Weber County Attorney's Office 
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Elizabeth Hunt 
Attorney. for Defendant 
Elizabeth Hunt LLC 
569 Browning Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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Attomey for Defendant/ Appellant 
EIJZA.BETH HUNT LLC 
569 BROWNING A VE. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 706-1114 
E-Facsimile: 1-801-443-1980 
Email: elizabeth.hunt@comcast.net 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
COOPERJOHN ANTHONY VAN 
HUIZEN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 131903542 
JUDGE·ERNIE JONES 
Cooper Van Huizen, by counse~ hereby gives notice of his appeal to the Utah Court 
of Appeals from this Court's omnibus ruling entered on August 29, 2014. 
Respectfully submitted on August 31, 2014. 
s/Eliz.abeth H11nt 
EIJZABETH HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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I hereby certify that on August 31, 2014, a true and correct copy of this was e-filed 
and thereby served on the Weber County Attorney's Office. 
bl Elitpbeth Hunt 
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ELIZABETH HUNT (#5292) 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
ELIZABETH HUNT LLC 
569 BROWNING A VE. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 706-1114 
E-Facsimile: 1- 801-443-1980 
Email: elizabeth.hunt@comcast.net 
IN THE SECOND DISTRlCT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN 
HUIZEN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL OF 
RIGHTFROMSERIOUSYOUTII 
OFFENDER BINDOVER ORDER 
Case No. 131903542 
WOGE ERNIE JONES 
Having considered the briefing of the parties, and good cause appearing, the Court 
hereby reinstates Cooper Van Huizen's right to appeal from the bindover order of the 
juvenile court following the Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing. The notice of 
appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of this order. 
SO ORDERED this_ day of _ ___. 2014. 
BY THE COURT: 
September 02, 2014 01: 16 PM 
THE HONORABLE ERNIE JONES 
JUDGE, SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
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1 SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER AMEND1\1ENTS 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
. 7 LONG TITLE 
8 Gene~ Description: 
2013 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Chief Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow 
Senate Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard 
~ 9 This bill amends the procedure to transfer jurisdiction for a serious youth offender from 
10 a juvenile court to a district court. 
11 Highlighted Provisions: 
12 This bill: 
13 • provides for a juvenile court judge to consider a minor's prior adjudications in 
14 juvenile court, a minor's best interest, and the public's safety when determining a 
15 jurisdiction transfer from a juvenile court to a district court; and 
16 • makes technical changes. 
17 Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
18 None 
19 Other Special Clauses: 
20 None 
21 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
22 AMENDS: 
23 78A-6-702, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2012, Chapter 118 
24 
25 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
26 
27 
Section 1. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read: 
78A-6-702. Serious youth offender--Procedure. 
28 (1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging 
29 a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the 
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30 juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses: 
31 (a) any felony violation of: 
32 (i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
33 (ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another; 
34 (iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [kidnaping] kidna1ming: 
35 (iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
36 (v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
37 
38 
39 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
40 (ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
41 (b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a 
42 dangerous weapon.s. which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been 
43 previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon.s. 
44 which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
45 (2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection 
46 (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
47 (3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the 
48 state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish 
49 probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed 
50 and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1 )(b ), the state shall have 
51 the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has 
52 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
53 weapon. 
54 (b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection 
55 (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district 
56 court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that [atl of the 
57 following eonditt011s exist.] it would be contrmy to the best interest of the minor and to the 
-2-
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58 public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
59 (c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge shall consider 
60 only the following: 
61 (i) whether the minor has [not] been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
62 involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
63 (ii) [that] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the 
64 minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; [and] 
65 (iii) [that] the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was [not] committed in a 
66 violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:']~ 
67 (iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and 
68 (v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the juvenile 
69 court or in the district court. 
70 [(tj]@ Once the state has met its burden under [tlm] Subsection (3).{fil as to a 
71 showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and 
72 presenting evidence [~ to the existence of the aboive conditions] that in light of the 
~ 73 considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c), it would be contracy: to the best interest of the minor 
7 4 and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district 
75 court. 
76 [td,] @ If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [aH-the 
77 above conditions ate satisfied,] it would be contraty to the best interest of the minor and the 
78 best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the 
79 court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
80 upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
81 ( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the 
82 state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over 
83 under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor 
~ 84 and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
85 (5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue. 
-3-
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86 The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be 
87 advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in 
88 accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
89 ( 6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, 
90 the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of 
91 probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant 
92 committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
93 additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
94 (7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
95 information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more 
96 . charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any 
97 subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with 
98 those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been 
99 committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to 
100 the district court to answer for those charges. 
101 (8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the 
102 jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is 
103 terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, 
104 and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in 
105 Subsection (12). 
106 (9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this 
107 section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a 
108 preliminary examination in the district court. 
109 (10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has 
110 previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
111 weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need 
112 to be proven at trial in the district court. 
113 (11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any 
-4-
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114 other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over 
115 the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
116 (12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
117 Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
118 is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on unspecified dates) 
3 CHAIRMAN: With that, our first item on the agenda will 
4 be House Bill, Representative Snow. Representative Snow, the 
5 time is yours. 
6 MR. SNOW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
7 committee. The bill before you, HB105 relates to the process in 
8 the State of Utah whereby we can or the court -- juvenile court 
9 can in certain cases involving a juvenile offender certify that 
10 juvenile to the district court to stand trial as an adult, and of 
11 course if found guilty, to be sentenced as an adult. 
12 This amendment relates to that process. The current 
13 code provision is fairly restrictive into how -- as to how that 
14 process works. First of all, the process only applies to 
15 juvenile offenders that are 16 years of age or older. Secondly, 
16 the way that it proceeds is once criminal information is filed 
17 for one of the offenses that are listed that are subject to being 
18 certified as an adult, the Court holds a probable cause hearing, 
19 essentially to determine whether or not there's probable causa to 
20 believe that the offender has committed one of those offenses, 
21 and then also as part of that, to determine whether or not the 
22 juvenile offender was has previously been in the juvenile 
23 system and has committed an offense using a dangerous weapon. 
24 If those burdens are met, then the Court under the 
25 current statutory scheme goes through a fairly narrow process in 
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determining whether or not this offender ought to be certified as 
an adult. The standard of evidence in that determination is by 
clear and convincing evidence, and the Court looks -- under the 
current statute the Court looks at three elements: whether or not 
this offender was previously adjudicated for an offense involving 
a dangerous weapon, whether or not if it was that the activity 
involved one or more co-defendants, whether or not this 
particular minor's culpability was less than the others, and 
whether or not there were elements of aggravated nature, a 
violent element, aggressive or premeditated element. 
Once those are met under our current code, the juvenile 
court judge really has no discretion. Once those are met, then 
the way the law is written, he or she sitting as the judge must 
certify that offender to district court, and then the offender 
goes through adult court to face those charges. Now clearly 
there are some crimes that are so egregious and heinous in their 
nature and by their facts that this was the reason this provision 
exists in the code. 
Now the purpose of the amendment is to keep that process 
and that procedure in place, but to add an element of discretion 
or a greater element of discretion in those cases where, 
according to the amendment, it would be in the best interest 
of the minor and the public to bind the defendant over to the 
jurisdiction of the court -- of the district court, but must meet 
in addition to the three elements that I've indicate. 
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1 The Court would also have a right to look at the nature 
2 and number of the prior adjudicated offenses, and also an overall 
3 determination analysis, is the public safety better served by 
4 adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the district 
5 court. 
6 Seated to my right, I should -- Mr. Chairman, members of 
7 the committee, I think most of you know Director Jacey Skinner, 
8 who is the director for the Utah Sentencing Commission. Before I 
9 take questions on the amendment, if it's okay, Mr. Chairman, I'd 
10 like to turn some time to Director Skinner to provide the 
11 committee with a little more context and history as to how this 
12 came about, this amendment, what the genesis was for it and why 
13 the director and her board believes that this is a proper 
14 amendment for the committee to consider and eventually be passed 
15 into law. Is that acceptable? 
16 CHAIRMAN: That would great. Ms. Skinner, if you'll 
17 just introduce yourself. 
18 MS. SKINNER: My name is Jacey Skinner. As mentioned, 
19 I'm the director of the Utah Sentencing Commission. Before I get 
20 started, I just wanted to thank you Representative Snow for his 
21 help with this particular bill. He's been very dedicated and 
22 helpful in helping us move those forward. 
23 As was mentioned, this -- this bill deals with our 
24 serious youth offender statute. To give you a little bit of 
25 history, I've provided a chart there. You should all have one. 
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It's entitled Utah Juvenile Transfer and Custody Laws. It 
explains the different methods by which we currently under our 
current law transfer juveniles from the juvenile court to the 
criminal system or the adult system. There are three methods. 
There is one which we call just statutory jurisdiction 
or where it's by -- by law, the crime is automatically filed in a 
criminal court. These cases are fairly narrow, but they're when 
the minor is 16 years of age or older and commits an offense that 
would me murder, aggravated murder. Those offenses are filed 
directly there, and there's no question there. Or if they've 
previously been transferred to the adult court -- to criminal 
court -- any case after that point is filed in that particular 
area. 
We also have a process called certification which is 
more of a discretionary waiver where it doesn't fall into any 
particular type of crime, but if the prosecutor feels like 
transfer may be warranted, they can file an information and put 
on a certification hearing for the judge where the judge has a 
lot of discretion to determine whether or not it's in the 
interest of the public or in the interest of the juvenile to 
transfer them to juvenile court. 
Then we have in the middle what we call a presumptive 
waiver type of a situation where and this is the statute that 
we're focusing on today which is called serious youth offender. 
It's a presumptive waiver which means that for a violation of any 
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of the crimes that you see listed there, that it's presumed that 
the juvenile will be transferred. Now as Mr. Representative Snow 
3 mentioned, the factors that exist that the Court has to find are 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
quite narrow and very well defined. After preliminary hearing 
the Court is asked to find -- to hold a retention factor hearing 
in which they are asked to find some of the following 
circumstances. It's a little awkward to follow because it's --
they must find that all of the circumstances exist, and they're 
kind of negative findings, so I'll walk you through them. 
So they -- the Court must find that the minor has not 
been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving a 
dangerous weapon. They must also find that if the offense is 
13 committed with one or more other persons, the minor appears to 
14 have a lesser degree of culpability than the co-defendants, and 
15 that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
16 violent, aggressive or premeditated manner. 
17 Because the Court must find all of these to exist, it's 
18 
19 
20 
21 
really difficult for them to ever retain a juvenile. So while we 
give the appearance that the judges have some discretion here and 
that they're making a decision, really, given the nature of these 
offenses -- and these are serious offenses. I don't -- I don't 
22 mean to lessen the degree of their seriousness at all. 
23 For instance, an aggravated burglary, it's very 
24 difficult to commit an aggravated burglary in a non-aggressive 
25 manner. So by the very nature that the Court has found that the 
J,:. 
,-. 
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probable cause exists, even if the minor has not been previously 
adjudicated delinquent for a weapon, even if there -- the offense 
was committed in concert with more than one person and their role 
in the crime was very minor, the fact that the crime itself was 
aggressive means that the Court has to bind them over. 
I became the director of this commission about four 
years ago, and one of the very first things that my commission 
started saying that they wanted to look at was this particular 
statute for that reason. All mem -- everyone involved felt 
like their hands were kind of tied. The Court said that these 
cases -- or the law says that these cases must be filed this 
way, and the juvenile court judges have really no discretion in 
deciding whether or not this juvenile should be transferred. 
The reason that this is frustrating for them is that 
they really may have a juvenile who has no previous history 
whatsoever; this is their first interaction with the juvenile 
court. Their role may have been a minor one. But again, because 
of the nature of the crime, they are -- they're transferred to 
the district court system. 
The prosecutors don't always think that that should be 
the case. The defense attorneys obviously don't think that that 
should be the case, and the judges are often frustrated that they 
are forced, because of the way the law is written, to transfer 
them. 
What happens when they are then transferred into the 
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district court is where we -- we're giving them these harsh adult 
sentences, is given the fact that they are very young, that they 
have no criminal history and that their role in the offense 
was -- may have been rather minor, we often see them being placed 
on probation, which is not really the purpose of sending someone 
to district court. 
If we think about why we would be transferring someone 
to the adult court from the juvenile court, I think there are 
two questions that we have to ask. First, is the harsher adult 
sentence needed. I would characterize that is that a sentence of 
a length and duration longer than we would have jurisdiction in 
the juvenile court needed as retribution or for public safety 
reasons in the adult system. 
Now in the juvenile court we can maintain jurisdiction 
until a juvenile is 21-years-old. The average age for these 
offenders is that they are 16. When they are transferred to the 
adult system, even if they are sanctioned, if they're sent to 
prison, we find nationally that the length of stay for juvenile 
offenders transferred to the adult system is a little over three 
years. The reality is they will be returned to the community. 
They will still be very young when they are returned to the 
community, and the question is, how are we going to be returning 
them to the community. 
The next question that we have to ask is did the 
transfer to adult court actually reduce the crime component or 
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future crime that will be committed. There have been a lot of 
studies of transfer laws across the country. One of the reasons 
for that is in the early 'B0's and the early '90's, which is 
or excuse me, the late '80's, early '90's, which is when our law 
was passed as well in its current form, I should say, there was a 
serious increase in concern about juvenile crime in the country, 
particularly a lot of offenders who were repeat offenders and 
very serious. They kind of coined the phrase super predator, and 
they expected these juveniles to become just very serious 
dangerous criminals, and so these laws were passed to remove them 
from the juvenile court system, to deal with them in the adult 
system, and to -- essentially the plan was to lock them up for a 
very long period of time. 
What we've seen since that time is that that forecast 
hasn't really played out. In fact, the cases have diminished 
significantly, and what we found is that the transfer to the 
adult system hasn't really paid off the way that we anticipated 
that it would. 
For instance, soon after our law was passed, we started 
having questions as to whether or not it was effective. In 2002 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice's study of the 
serious youth offender and transfer cases. In that year there 
were 65 juveniles that were identified as serious youth 
offenders. I can go through what happened there. In that case 
about half of them were placed on probation in 2002. 
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1 Looking at the same cases for last year, we were able to 
2 identify 11 total transfer cases -- now that included -- that 
3 includes certification cases and serious youth offender cases. 
4 There were five total serious youth offender cases last year. 
5 So as we can see, these cases have dropped off 
6 dramatically. Out of those, three of them were placed in prison, 
7 two of them were placed on probation. The two that were placed 
8 on probation were -- when we look at their offenses, we can 
9 assume that the judge looked at the case and said, again, this is 
10 not a serious enough of an offense -- or not offense, but doesn't 
11 warrant a prison sentence in this particular instance. So there 
12 are lots of things that a district court judge takes into play 
13 when they're making that sentence. 
14 What we are trying to do with this particular amendment 
15 is to not change that system altogether. We recognize that there 
16 are very serious crimes that are committed by young people in our 
17 community. Some of those cannot be dealt with appropriately in 
18 the juvenile court system. Some of them -- some of them warrant 
19 for public safety reasons being transferred. The phrase that 
20 you'll always here with these laws is that they were created to 
21 deal with the juveniles, the worst of the worst, and those who 
22 had exhausted the resources of the juvenile court system. 
23 As we can see through these factors that exist right 
24 now, the juvenile's history doesn't really come into play. It 
25 can be the juvenile's first offense, their first interaction with 
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the court system, and they could end up being transferred. So. 
that exhausting the resources of the juvenile court system 
doesn't become a factor. 
The worst of the worst does come into play with these 
are the worst offenses that we do see, but it doesn't necessarily 
mean that the minor's role was the worst in them. As you all 
know, different facts come into each particular scenario, and we 
need to be able to look at them. 
My commission, as you know, is charged with maintaining 
maximum discretion for and encouraging discretion for sentencing 
judges. This is one of those areas where we feel like we really 
need to make some improvement. So this amendment is trying to do 
just that, is to provide that -- that discretion in making those 
decisions. 
As you can see, rather than a shall bind them over if 
all of the following factors are found, the standard becomes --
and this is in line 57 -- they shall bind them over unless the 
Court finds it will be contrary to the best interest of the minor 
and the public not to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction 
of the district court. That is an and. 
So we are looking at both of these -- both of these 
factors coming into play, particularly when I asked the two 
questions before one can ask, how is it in the best interest of 
the public not to bind them over. We may find that the juvenile 
will be much better served in the juvenile court system where we 
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can provide them services that do very well at reducing 
recidivism rather than transferring them to a system that is not 
equipped to deal with juveniles, particularly if they are placed 
on probation, they're not going to receive those services that 
may help reduce their criminogenic needs in the same way that 
they would be able to receive in the juvenile court system. 
In reviewing transfer laws, we do find that particular 
for violent offenses, a juvenile who is maintained in the 
juvenile court system versus a juvenile that's transferred to the 
criminal system or the adult system, we find consistently that 
those who are transferred to the adult system for violent 
offenses reoffend more frequently and sooner than those who are 
maintained in the juvenile court system. 
So again, recognizing that we do have a need in some 
instances to make these transfers, we want to make sure that that 
can happen, but we want to give the judge the opportunity to look 
at this particular minor, their interaction with the juvenile 
court system before, the nature of the offense before them, and 
to make an appropriate decision as to whether or not the public 
and the minor would be best served in the juvenile court or in 
the criminal court system. With that, I think I'd be open to any 
questions. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Ms. Skinner. I do have 
a question here. Representative Aaron? 
MS. AARON: Thank you. Just first question, when you 
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talk about line 58, you -- both times you referred to that line 
you said not to bindover. There's no not in that sentence. I 
want to make sure we're clear on that. 
MS. SKINNER: Yes. They will bindover if they find that 
it -- or excuse me, unless -- there's an unless there on 56. 
MS. AARON: Right. 
MS. SKINNER: So unless they find it would be contrary 
to the interest of the minor and to the public. 
MS. AARON: Thank you. Could you tell me a little bit 
about your studies in terms of -- I know some of these have an 
age limit of 14, some of them have 16. Have you done any 
analysis of that in terms of how often they've bound over? 
MS. SKINNER: These are age limits for the statutes 
themselves, so because of the different nature of the statutes, 
it -- the presumption is a little bit different. So 
certification cases aren't filed nearly as frequently. This is 
14 years of age or older. They're not filed as frequently, but 
are -- are filed. 
When they are, cases that I looked at from last year, 
they were all bound over, but I don't have -- I can't say with 
I can't say that there weren't others that were considered to be 
filed that way that -- this isn't making any sense as I'm saying 
this, but those numbers didn't show up because they didn't reach 
the transfer level, and so they maintained themselves in the 
juvenile court system. 
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So those that we looked over and in talking with 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, I'm not aware of any from last 
year -- I can say that -- that were not bound over. Those are 
usually at -- done after giving a lot of thought and large 
hearings that are placed on. 
With the serious youth offender, again it does -- pardon 
me. It does depend on their age. Now again, these are the cases 
that are bound over that we're looking at. What we do know, and 
this comes from both judges and from prosecutors is that when 
they look at a child, one who may be younger or has lesser 
culpability, that oftentimes because the statute is so 
restrictive, they're finding other ways to make their way around 
the statute. So they'll file one of the charges that is not on 
the list, or they will come to some other kind of agreement in 
order to avoid this, because the statute really does require that 
transfer. Does that answer your question? 
MS. AARON: Yes, it does. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN: Do we have any other questions? 
Representative Hall? 
MR. HALL: Could you just discuss the fiscal note that 
we have related to this bill? I don't -- either Ms. Skinner or 
Representative Snow. 
MS. SKINNER: There is a fiscal note on the bill. This 
is coming from juvenile justice services. They are estimating 
that -- a couple of things. They're estimating that with the --
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1 with the change to the statute that there will be more cases 
2 filed. I can only assume that this would be because the statute 
3 will give some discretion. Those cases that are now being filed 
4 outside of the statute in an effort to avoid the requirements 
5 will now be filed under the particular statute, so the cases may 
6 increase. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
What I can tell you, though, is that they are cases that 
if they're trying to avoid the statute to begin with, I think 
they're the cases that both the prosecutor and the judge feel 
like may be retained under this particular statute given that 
option. So I don't think that it would increase. Those are kids 
12 that are already staying in the juvenile court system. 
13 What JJS is estimating is that with this statute there 
14 will be juveniles who are currently being sent to the district 
15 court system who will be maintained in the juvenile court system, 
16 and accordingly, they will need to provide services for those 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
juveniles. So that's what the fiscal note is based on. They're 
estimating that most of those will go to secure care. That is 
their estimate. 
MR. HALL: Do you have any reason to disagree with the 
amount? 
MS. SKINNER: It's really hard to know. As I said 
23 before, we don't know how many cases will -- each year the cases 
24 differ, and we do expect that they will be changed a little bit. 
25 In my -- in looking at the cases that have been filed over the 
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last few years, we do have a large number of those cases where 
the juveniles really do~'t have any prior history at all. 
When they are transferred to the adult system, their cases are 
greatly -- in the course of a plea bargain greatly reduced. 
Like I said, they're placed on probation in many 
cases. Those juveniles are what I would classify as lower risk 
offenders, and it's hard to know what would happen with them in 
the juvenile court system, if the Court would them to secure 
care, and if all of these juveniles are retained and are sent to 
secure care, then that probably is an accurate estimate. 
If they are not, if they are retained and placed on 
probation or given some other services, to that I don't think 
the fiscal note would arise to that amount. 
It's also, as I said, difficult to know the numbers. 
They're estimating -- I can't remember if it's four or six 
juveniles that will be retained in addition to those that are 
currently retained. As I said, last year we had a total of five 
cases total, and so it's hard to know where those will coming 
from -- will be coming from. 
MR. HALL: Thank you. 
MR. LOWRY: Can I weigh on that a little bit, too? I 
certainly don't have the background that the director has, but I 
think the feeling is anecdotally that for those whose -- when 
jurisdiction is transferred to the district court and those 
juveniles or those offenders are placed on probation, the 
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probation department for adults is really not equipped to deal 
specifically or as well for juvenile offenders as juvenile 
probation officers. 
So while there may be some savings at that point, 
ultimately there is a high risk that we're going to see those 
folks back into the system, as Ms. Skinner as already alluded to. 
So ultimately, and in the long run we think that there is a good 
chance that the State is going to spend more money as those youth 
offenders mature and they -- and their issues are not addressed, 
we're going to see them again and it's going to cost more money 
in the long run. Does that make sense? 
MR. HALL: Sure. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN: Any other questions? I have one as the 
chair. I'm just curious, I mean I know we've been talking a lot 
about juvenile court -- or juvenile facilities being shut down. 
Will -- on the fiscal note, are we going to be able to help the 
juvenile facility folks be able to deal with some of the issues 
that we're so concerned with in not shutting some of these 
facilities down and giving them the resources to deal with the 
problems that they don't have? Do you happen to know? 
MS. SKINNER: I'm sure any resources that are allotted 
to their system will be helpful in helping them maintain this. 
These -- the estimates here are for juveniles that are placed in 
secure care and in community based placements. Those are the 
estimates that they maintain. I'm not sure if the money that 
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would be dedicated based on this particular offense would be 
dedicated to those facilities or those programs, or if they could 
be used for some of the other programs. I'm not sure how that 
would -- how that would play out. I can find out for you. 
CHAIRMAN: That would be great. The other concern I 
would have is -- I mean there's been talk last year, we almost 
had one of our facilities shut down, and obviously we're going 
this direction, which I think is a worthy direction to go in, but 
if you suddenly shut down a facility and then we'd have no place 
to put these -- these youth, that creates a huge bind in our 
system, so I'm just kind of -- wanted to make sure on that. 
MS. SKINNER: It does, yes. 
CHAIRMAN: Any other questions? Do we have anybody in 
the audience that would like to address this issue? Please come 
forward and state your name. 
MR. GORDON: I'm Ron Gordon, the executive director of 
the commission on criminal and juvenile justice. The original 
serious youth offender law was passed in 1996. My office was 
involved in the law at that time, and we've remained involved 
with this while over the course of those intervening 17 years. 
We've made a number of relatively minor changes to the 
law over the -- that time, and I'm here today in support. My 
commission, my office supports this bill as an important change 
to ensure the integrity of the serious youth offender law. 
The point of the law is to find appropriate ways to 
-~ 
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address the most serious juveniles, and the current law does not 
allow adequate flexibility. So the bill that Representative Snow 
is bringing forth strikes a very delicate balance between 
providing additional discretion to juvenile court judges in 
certain circumstances, while also maintaining public safety. The 
focus of the bill remains public safety. 
A juvenile court judge is not permitted to retain a 
juvenile if that harms public safety or is not in the best 
interest of public safety. It does permit the juvenile court 
some discretion to retain some juveniles when it is not a threat 
to the public safety and will provide in better services being 
delivered to that juvenile, which only increases the overall 
public safety. 
So my commission stands in full support of the bill. 
We extend appreciation to Representative Snow for bringing this 
forward to the sentencing commission for studying it over many 
years, and as I said bef~re, it strikes a delicate balance 
between the discretion that's necessary to make these very 
difficult decisions while also maintaining public safety. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Any questions for Mr. Gordon? 
Seeing none, thank you. Anybody else? Oh, yes. 
MR. BOYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Paul Boyden, 
executive director of Statewide Association of Prosecutors. We 
have been involved in this issue, obviously, for a long time. We 
helped draft the original 18 years ago, and these retention 
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factors have been a concern all along. I've been on the 
sentencing commission, and of course involved with the prosecutor 
for that length of time. 
This is not a minor change. This is significant. We're 
talking about changing these factors so that the Court so that 
the discretion goes to the Court, because de facto the way it 
operates right now is the prosecutors are kind of making the 
decision on what to charge as to whether this is going to end up 
in the adult court or the juvenile court. 
Nobody likes to give up power, of course. That would 
include prosecutors, but we do understand that this is the kind 
of thing where really the judges need a little more discretion on 
this kind of thing. We need to -- we need to adjust these 
factors because they just are -- they have been a problem all 
along, and so we really need to deal with those issues. 
The big concern we have is we just -- we're trusting the 
juvenile court judges at this time to make those decisions, and 
particularly to take into account the needs of the public because 
in criminal prosecution, it's very important for the public to 
feel that justice is being done. In some cases they feel that 
juveniles should be tried as adults, and that's an important 
issue for justice to be done. 
23 So we're probably never going to be entirely through 
24 with tweaking these issues, but we certainly don't oppose this. 
25 We've been involved in the process all along for a very long 
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time. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Boyden. Do we have any 
questions? No. Thank you. Anyone else from the audience? If 
not, I'll bring it back to the committee for any other clarifying 
questions. If not, we'll go back to Representative Snow for 
summation. 
MR. SNOW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say that 
I appreciate Director Skinner and for all of her work and the 
work of the commission and all those who have helped coordinate 
on drafting this bill. This has been a long process, and I think 
they have indicated -- those that have spoke today -- this is 
something that's been thought through for a long period of time. 
It's supported by Statewide Association of Prosecutors, CCJJ, 
Utah Sentencing Commission and the Council of Juvenile Court 
Judges in this state, so it has -- it has broad support. 
It's a good change. It allows in a very narrow 
situation discretion on the part of the juvenile court judges 
and by the way, we have some great judges sitting on our juvenile 
court benches. It offers in a very narrow situation discretion 
in whether in making a proper decision on whether or not to 
transfer jurisdiction to adult court in those situations where 
the best interests of the public will be served, as well as the 
best interests of the minor. So I believe that it's an 
appropriate change. It's a good change in our judicial criminal 
policy, and I would look for support from the committee. Thank 
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you, Mr. Chairman. 
(Conclusion of Mr. Snow's comments) 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: House Bill 105. 
MADAME CLERK: House Bill 105, serious youth offender 
amendments. Senator Hillyard? 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Senator Hillyard? 
MR. HILLYARD: In juvenile court we have a provision for 
serious youth offenders which requires them to be certified as 
adults, and it's usually somebody 16, 17-years-old who have 
committed a horrific crime. The problem has been the way the 
statute has been drawn it's pretty well automatic. This 
amendment makes it more discretionary with the Court, because 
some of the kids are being certified over. When they get in 
adult court are just released on probation and not given help 
that the juvenile court can give and structure to do. 
So this is brought to us by the CCJJ in a leveling 
influence to allow a little bit more discretion in the juvenile 
court to make sure that the people who should be punished are 
19 punished, and those who may need some treatment (inaudible) 
20 process have that opportunity. Be glad to respond to any 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
questions. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Thank you, Senator. Questions for 
Senator Hillyard? 
MR. HILLYARD: I'll call for question on the bill. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Seeing none -- and the question is 
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shall House Bill 105 pass? Roll call vote. 
(Conclusion of Senator Hillyard's remarks) 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Madame reading clerk? 
MADAME CLERK: House Bill 105, serious youth offender 
5 amendments, Representative Snow. This bill was heard in 
6 judiciary with a vote of 7-0-2. 
7 
8 
9 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Representative Snow. 
MR. SNOW: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. As this body 
knows, our criminal justice system in the State of Utah is 
10 divided into two parts, one that deals with adult offenders and 
one that deals with juvenile offenders. This particular bill 11 
12 deals with juvenile offenders whose crimes alleged are serious 
13 enough that a prosecutor who is prosecuting those may feel 
14 inclined to transfer them to adult court to stand trial as an 
15 adult and ultimately be sentenced, and perhaps even incarcerated 
16 as an adult. 
17 Now currently in Utah there are three ways that can be 
18 accomplished. House Bill 105 deals only with one particular 
19 process, and let me tell you why I'm bringing the bill. Under 
20 that process as it exists today, an offender -- a youth offender 
21 who qualifies, over the age of 16, and who has committed one of 
22 the offenses enumerated, fairly serious offenses at lines 31 
23 through 44, his case or her case can be transferred to adult 
24 court after a hearing i~ held in juvenile court before the 
25 juvenile court judge, and as long as certain elements are met. 
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Now if those elements are met, the juvenile court judge 
sitting and hearing the case has no discretion except to bind 
that young person over to stand trial as an adult. It is that 
rigidity in the bill that prompts me bringing -- or excuse me, it 
is that rigidity in the existing law that prompts me bringing 
this bill. 
Now I will tell you that this bill that is before you 
has been worked on at least for two years. It is supported by 
the commission on criminal and juvenile justice, the Utah 
sentencing commission, the Utah Juvenile Justice Service, and 
also by the Statewide Association of Prosecutors. 
What does the bill do? It keeps in place the procedure 
where those who have been charged with serious offenses can still 
be transferred to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; 
however, it broadens the discretion of the Court. 
Now why is that necessary? Under the current rigid 
structure, we actually have unintended consequences where a 
juvenile under this scenario who meets those requirements, maybe 
has very limited involvement with the juvenile court previously, 
but meets those elements, could be transferred to the district 
court, and either plead guilty or be found guilty and then stand 
before that Court for sentencing. 
The problem with the current system is the -- if the 
offense is not of such a magnitude that the Court would be 
inclined to impose a jail sentence or imprisonment on that 
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juvenile, the Court most likely is inclined to order probation. 
The problem with that scenario is our adult probation in this 
state is not really equipped to deal with a juvenile -- juvenile 
supervision. 
As a result, and as an unintended consequence, 
those serious youth offenders who then are transferred to a 
probation -- adult probation -- have very limited supervision. 
Their supervision terminates after a period of time, and the 
youth offender is not really -- and his or her issues are not 
really addressed, at least to the same extent that they would be 
under a juvenile court supervised probation. 
Now the standard by which a juvenile court judge making 
that determination is fairly significant. The juvenile court 
judge before they would retain this offender in juvenile court 
would have to make two findings, one that it's in the best 
interest of the juvenile, that jurisdiction be retained in the 
juvenile court, and the second, that it's in the best interest of 
the safety and welfare of the citizens of this state. So it's a 
fairly narrow band in which a juvenile offender would -- who had 
committed some serious offense whose jurisdiction would be 
retained. 
The benefit would be on retention in the juvenile court 
system whether it -- whether it required detention or whether it 
required supervision is our system in this state is then able to 
address the needs of that juvenile, and the likelihood of 
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reoffending is much less. In fact, the statistics show across 
the country that in cases where a juvenile is tried as an adult 
and then is put on probation as an adult -- under adult 
supervision, the recidivism, the rate at which they reoffend is 
higher than if that same juvenile were maintained under the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
Now that's a lot of talking to say that this bill 
provides additional discretion to our juvenile court judges to 
make the right decision in deciding whether or not to transfer a 
juvenile offender for serious offenses to the district court to 
stand trial or to be sentenced. I'm ready to take questions. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Thank you, Representative Snow. 
Discussion to the bill? Representative King? 
MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. Will the 
~· 
' 
' . 
~ 
sponsor yield? ~ 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Will the sponsor yield? 
MR. LOWRY: Yes, sure. 
MR. KING: If you could, Representative, could you 
explain for us the fiscal note? 
MR. LOWRY: There is a fiscal note that is appended to 
this bill, and I think if you -- you each have a copy of that. 
The fiscal bill current impact appears based on meetings that has 
been held with the fiscal analyst as recently as this afternoon 
is that that impact is probably going to be reduced, and I 
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don't -- you don't have it front of you in writing, but I believe 
it's going to be reduced to about $50,000. 
Now it is true there is an impact, but if we -- we have 
to decide, I suppose, from policy standpoint whether or not the 
long term costs and risks associated with moving those juvenile 
offenders who commit serious offenses to the adult system, their 
chances of reoffending, and there's a saying among juvenile court 
officers and those who supervise juveniles, and it goes something 
like this. Once we take a juvenile and we put them in a certain 
environment -- in jail or in prison with adults, criminals -- you 
have almost certainly created another criminal and a serious 
criminal once that juvenile is released. 
So while it is true that, Representative, that there is 
a fiscal note, my understanding is No. 1, it can be mitigated, 
and No. 2, it's my position that this is a good policy, and we'll 
have to deal with that, but it's good policy for the State in the 
long run to assume that cost rather than creating long range 
issues that we're going to have to deal with later. 
MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. I want to 
address that point. One of the things that you'd look at if you 
look carefully at the fiscal note is there is some savings to the 
cost of administering the adult justice system because of this, 
and there is some additional expenditure to the juvenile justice 
system. I don't -- it's not troubling to me that we're spending 
more money on the juvenile justice system with these kids. I 
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think this is a great bill. 
I commend the bill sponsor for his work on this because 
giving greater discretion to keep juveniles out of the adult 
system who should in the minds of those working in the juvenile 
system be kept in the juvenile system is increases the 
likelihood that we're going to be able to have those kids given 
the resources that they need to keep them from reoffender, to 
keep them from recidivating. That's a positive thing. This is, 
in my mind, an investment in the future of these kids. I'm glad 
to hear that the fiscal note is lower than what the bill sponsor 
originally obtained. 
I think that's a good thing, but I don't want the body 
to be deterred by the existence of a fiscal note at all, because 
the resources that we're talking about are going in to helping 
rehabilitate these kids before they become habitual offenders or 
become -- or before they become adults. So I would encourage 
your support of this bill. Thank you. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Further discussion to the bill, 
Representative Mciff? 
MR. MCIFF: Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. I wish to 
offer a simple analogy to make a point. If you want to be a good 
horseman, you have to know when to pull back on the reins and 
when to ease off, but you can never know that until you're in 
the saddle and you see what the horse does. That same concept 
applies to young people. It is impossible for us to statutorily 
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fix whether a youth should be tried as an adult or as a juvenile, 
and that decision cannot be fairly and realistically made until 
you're in the saddle, and the youth is before the Court, the 
Court can evaluate all the considerations related to this young 
person and the offense that's been committed. So I agree, this 
is sound public policy, and we should support the bill. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Representative Mciff. Further 
discussion to the bill? Seeing none, Representative Snow for 
summation. 
MR. SNOW: Thank you. In summary, No. 1, this does not 
change or do away with the process that we have in our state 
where some serious youth offenders ought to be tried as an adult, 
and in some cases in very egregious cases ought to -- ought to be 
incarcerated as an adult. That still remains in place. 
The second thing, this bill, as has been mentioned, 
provides some discretion -- addition discretion to juvenile court 
judges to help make a decision that's in the best interest of the 
person charged, but also in the best interests of the public. 
The third thing that I'd mention with respect to the fiscal bill, 
one way or another, whether that juvenile is going to supervised 
or incarcerated as an adult or supervised as a juvenile, there is 
going to be a cost. 
There is a little more -- there is -- not a little more. 
There is a greater cost in the structure that we build with 
respect to supervising and rehabilitating juveniles, but in the 
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long run, I believe it's money well spent in the state, and I 
urge your support. Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern. 
SPEAKER PRO TEM: Thank you, Representative Snow. 
Voting is open on House Bill 105. 
(Conclusion of Mr. Lowry's statements) 
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Constitution of Utah, Article I§ 7 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 
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Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-222 
78A-2-222. Disqualification for interest or relation to parties. 
(1) Except by consent of all parties, a justice, judge, or justice court judge may 
not sit or act in any action or proceeding. 
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested; 
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the 
third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law; or 
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or 
proceeding. 
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to the arrangement of the 
calendar or the regulation of the order of business, nor to the power of transferring 
the action or proceeding to some other court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue 
all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) (i) a final order or decree resulting from: 
(A) a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency; or 
(B) a permit review adjudicative proceeding, as defined in Section 19-1-
301.5; or 
t·. 
j,< 
j. 
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(ii) an appeal from the district court review of an infonnal adjudicative 
proceeding of an agency other than the following: 
(A) the Public Service Commission; 
(B) the State Tax Commission; 
(q the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(D) the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action 
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources; 
(E) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(F) the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of. 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state 
or other local agencies; and 
(rl) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
( d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
( e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but 
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
G) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of 
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 78a-6-702(2012) 
78A-6-702 
o Serious youth offender -- Procedure. 
o (1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general 
charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal 
information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the 
following offenses: 
• (a) any felony violation of: 
• (i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
• (ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury to another; 
• (iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
• (iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
•. (v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
• (vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
• (vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm; 
• (viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
• (ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
• (b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use 
of a dangerous weapon which would be· a felony if committed by an adult, 
and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the. use of a dangerous weapon which also would have been a 
felony if committed by an adult. 
o (2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
0 (3) 
• (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection 
(1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the 
burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the 
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have the 
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additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
• (b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this 
Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless 
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist 
• (i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
• (ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, 
the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the 
codefendants; and 
• (iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
• (c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3) as to a 
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going 
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above 
conditions. 
• ( d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings 
and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the 
information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
o ( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but 
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind 
the defendant over under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the 
defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the infonnation as 
though it were a juvenile petition. 
o (5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall 
issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal 
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The 
juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
o (6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this 
section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not 
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include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was 
committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations 
listed in Subsection (3) (b ). 
o (7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
infonnation or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against 
him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds 
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the 
defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the 
district court to answer for those charges. 
o (8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, 
the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court 
over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising 
from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies 
charged against the minor, except as provided in Subsection (12). 
o (9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under 
this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not 
entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
o (10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant 
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a 
dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the 
criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
o (11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or 
any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court 
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
o (12) The juvenile court und_er Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over 
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
charges in the district court. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78a-6-702(2013) 
• 
o Serious youth offender -- Procedure. 
o (1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general 
charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal 
information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the 
following offenses: 
• (a) any felony violation of: 
• (i) Section 7 6-6-103, aggravated arson; 
• (ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury to another; 
• (iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping; 
• (iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
• (v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
• (vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
• (vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a fireann; 
• (viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
• (ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
• (b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (1)(a) involving the use 
of a dangerous weapon [)which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon ill]which also would have 
been a felony if committed by an adult. 
o (2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
0 (3) 
• (a) If the infonnation alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection 
(1 ), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the 
burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the 
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1)(b), the state shall have the 
additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
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defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
• (b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this 
Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless 
the juvenile court judge finds it would be contrary to the best interest of the 
minor and to the public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the 
district court. 
• (c) In making the bind over detennination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge 
shall consider only the following: 
• (i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for 
an offense inv:olving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
• (ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, 
whether the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of 
culpability than the codefendants; 
• (iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed 
in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner; 
• (iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the 
juvenile court; and 
• (v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in 
the juvenile court or in the district court. 
• (d) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3)(a) s to 
a showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of 
going forward and presenting evidence that in light of the 
considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c), it would be contrary to the 
best interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to bind 
the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
• ( e) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the bet 
interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of 
the district court, the court shall so state in its findings and order the 
minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information 
as though it were a juvenile petition. 
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o ( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but 
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind 
the defendant over under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the 
defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the infonnation as 
though it were a juvenile petition. 
o (5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall 
issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal 
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The 
juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
o (6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this 
section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not 
include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was 
committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations 
listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
o (7) When a defendant is charged with multiple crinunal offenses in the same 
infonnation or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against 
him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds 
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the 
defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the 
district court to answer for those charges. 
o (8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, 
the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court 
over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising 
from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies 
charged against the minor, except as provided in Subsection (12). 
o (9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under 
this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not 
entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
o (10) Allegations contained in the indictment or infonnation that the defendant 
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a 
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dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the 
criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
o (11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or 
any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court 
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
o (12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-703 and the Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over 
the minor when there is an acquitta~ a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-704 
78A-6-704. Appeals from serious youth offender and certification 
proceedings. 
(1) A minor may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) an order of the juvenile court binding the minor over to the district court as a 
serious youth offender pursuant to Section 78.A-6-702; or 
(b) an order of the juvenile court, after certification proceedings pursuant to 
Section 78A-6-703, directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings 
in the district court. 
(2) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) an order of the juvenile court that a minor charged as a serious youth offender 
pursuant to Section 78A-6-702 be held for trial in the juvenile court; or 
(b) a refusal by the juvenile court, after certification procee~gs pursuant to 
Section 78A-6-703, to order that a minor be held for criminal proceedings in 
the district court. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble 
PREAMBLE 
[1] An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of 
justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an 
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of 
integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary 
plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent 
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in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and 
collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to 
maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system. 
[2] Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times and should 
avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and 
personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest 
possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and 
competence. 
[3] The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct establishes standards for the ethical 
conduct of judges and judicial candidates. It is not intended as an exhaustive guide 
for the conduct of judges and judicial candidates, who are govemed in their judicial 
and personal conduct by general ethical standards, as well as by the Code. The Code 
is intended, however, to provide guidance and assist judges in maintaining the highest 
standards of judicial and personal conduct and to provide a basis for regulating their 
conduct through the judicial disciplinary system. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 
CANON1 
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE 
INDEPENDENCE,* INTEGRITY,*AND IMPARTIALITY*OF THE 
JUDICIARY AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY* AND THE 
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.2 
RULE1.2 
Promo#ng Confidsn&e in tbs J •di&ia,y 
A judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes-and shall not 
undermine-public confidence in the independence* integrity,* and 
impartiality* of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety* and 
the appearance of impropriety. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 
CANON2 
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE 
IMPARTIALLY,* COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY. 
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Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2 
he justice system. 
RULE2.2 
Impartiality* and Fairness 
A judge shall uphold and apply the law,* and shall perform all duties of 
judicial office fairly and impartially. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.3 
Bias, Prej11di&e, and Harassment* 
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including 
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice. 
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or 
conduct manifest bias or prejudice or engage in harassment, including but not 
limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, 
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital 
status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit court 
staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge's direction and control to do 
so. 
(C) A judge shall take reasonable measures to require lawyers in 
proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, or 
engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to 
race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual 
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, 
against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others. 
(D) The restrictions of paragraphs (B) and (C) do not preclude judges or 
lawyers from making legitimate reference to the listed factors, or similar 
factors, when they are relevant to an issue in a proceeding. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.4 
RULE2.4 
External Inf/11,n&es on ]11dicial Cond11&t 
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(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism. 
(B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other 
interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or ·· 
judgment. 
(C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that 
any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 
RULE2.11 
Dist11alifieatio11 
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which 
the judge's impartialitytc might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to the following circumstances: 
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 
party's lawyer, or personal lmowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the 
proceeding. 
(2) The judge knows* that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic 
partner,* or a person within the third degree of relationship* to either of them, 
or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: 
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, 
managing member, or trustee of a party; 
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
( c) a person who has more than a de minimis* interest that could be 
substantially affected by the proceeding; or 
( d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary,* or the 
judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the 
judge's family residing in the judge's household,* has an economic interest* 
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding. 
( 4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a 
party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has within the previous three 
years made aggregate* contributions* to the judge's retention in an amount 
that is greater than $50 . 
(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate,* has made a public 
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that 
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commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in 
a particular way in the proceeding or controversy. 
(6) The judge: 
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a 
lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such 
association; 
(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated 
personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the 
proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning 
the merits of the particular matter in controversy; 
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or 
( d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court and is 
now acting as a judge who would hear the appeal or trial de novo. 
(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary 
economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the 
personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and 
minor children residing in the judge's household. 
(C) A trial court judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other 
than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record 
the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their 
lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, 
whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and 
lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the 
judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. 
The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding. 
(D) An appellate court judge or justice subject to disqualification under 
this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may send 
notice to the parties disclosing the basis for the judge or justice's 
disqualification and asking them to consider whether to waive 
disqualification. With respect to paragraphs (A)(2) or (A)(3), the judge or 
justice may participate in the decision of the case if all parties, other than the 
party presumably benefitted by the apparent bias constituting the 
disqualifying circumstance, waive the disqualification. With respect to 
paragraphs (A)(4) through (A)(6), the judge or justice may participate in the 
decision of the case if all parties waive the disqualification. The responses to a 
notice of a disqualifying circumstance shall be included in the appellate file 
pertaining to the proceeding. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence 
Evidenceisrelevantif. 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence; and 
(h) the fact is of consequence in determirung the action. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: 
• the United States Constitution; 
• the Utah Constitution; 
• a statute; or 
• rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of 
Time, or Other Reasons 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts 
(a) Character Evidence. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not 
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
confonnity with the character or trait. 
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(b) 
(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The 
following exceptions apply in a criminal case: 
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and 
if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to 
rebut it; 
(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer evidence 
of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, 
the prosecutor may: 
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and 
(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and 
(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the alleged 
victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
first aggressor. 
(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness's character may be 
admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in confonnity with the character. 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack 
of accident. On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor 
must 
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence 
that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and 
(B) do so before trial, or during trial if the court excuses lack of pretrial 
notice on good cause shown. 
( c) Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation Cases. 
~ 
·~ 
I 
;~ 
~ 
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(1) Permitted Uses. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of 
child molestation, ~e court may admit evidence that the defendant 
committed any other acts of child molestation to prove a propensity to 
commit the crime charged. 
(2) Disclosure. If the prosecution intends to offer this evidence it shall 
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court 
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown. 
(3) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in 
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this 
state, be a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(4) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise 
admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay 
(a) Statement. "Statement'' means a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or 
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. "Declarant'' means the person who made the statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" means a statement that: 
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; 
and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement 
( d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following 
conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or 
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(B) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or 
acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier. 
(2) An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered against an 
opposing party and: 
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; 
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true; 
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a 
statement on the subject; 
(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the 
scope of that relationship and while it existed; or 
(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 
Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 22 
Rule 22. Initial appearance and preliminary examination in cases under 
Section 78A-6-702 and Section 78A-6-703. 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the minor shall appear 
before the court as directed in the swnmons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest of a minor without a 
warrant, the minor shall be taken to a detention center pending a detention hearing, 
which shall be held as provided by these rules. When any peace officer makes an 
arrest of a minor with a warrant, the minor shall be taken to the place designated on 
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the warrant If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed without delay in 
the court with jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c) If a minor is arrested in a county other than where the offense was committed 
the minor shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime 
was committed and shall be taken before a judge of the juvenile court. 
(d) The court shall, upon the minor's first appearance, infonn the minor: 
(d)(1) of the charge in the infonnation or indictment and furnish the minor with a 
copy; 
(d)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information 
and how to obtain them; 
(d)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if the minor is unable to obtain counsel; 
(d.)(4) of rights concerning detention, pretrial release, and bail in the event the 
minor is bound over to stand trial in district court; and 
(d)(S) that the minor is not required to make any statement, and that any 
statements made may be used against the minor in a court of law. 
(e) The court shall, after providing the information under paragraph (d) and 
before proceeding further, allow the minor reasonable time and opportunity to 
consult counsel and shall allow the minor to contact any attorney by any reasonable 
means, without delay and without fee. 
(t)(1) The minor may not be called on to enter a plea. During the initial 
appearance, the minor shall be advised of the right to a preliminary examination and, 
as applicable, to a certification hearing pursuant to Section 78A-6-703 or to the right 
to present evidence regarding the conditions established by Section 78A-6-702. If the 
minor waives the right to a preliminary examination and, if applicable, a certification 
hearing, and if the prosecuting attorney consents, the court shall order the minor 
bound over to answer in the district court. 
(t)(2) If the minor does not waive a preliminary examination, the court shall 
schedule the preliminary examination. The time periods of this rule may be extended 
by the court for good cause shown. The preliminary examination shall be held within 
a reasonable time, but not later than ten days after the initial appearance if the minor 
is in custody for the offense charged and the information is filed under Section 78A-
6-702. The preliminary examination shall be held within a reasonable time, but not 
later than 30 days after the initial appearance if: 
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(f)(2)(A) the minor is in custody for the offense charged and the infonnation is 
filed under Section78A-6-703; or 
(f)(2)(B) the minor is not in custody. 
(f)(3) A preliminary examination may not be held if the minor is indicted. If the 
indictment is filed under 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in accordance with Rule 
23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding the factors of Section 78A-
6-703 for waiver of jurisdiction and certification, unless the hearing is waived. If the 
indictment is filed under Section 78A-6-702, the court shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented by the minor regarding the conditions. of 
Section 78A-6-702, if requested. 
(g) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws applicable to 
criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of proof and shall 
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify 
under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The minor may cross-examine 
adverse witnesses. 
(h) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the minor has committed it, and if the 
infonnation is filed under Section 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding the factors of 
Section 78A-6-703 for waiver of jurisdiction and certification. 
(i) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the minor has committed it, and if the 
infonnation is filed under Section78A-6-702, the court shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented by the minor regarding the conditions of 
Section 78A-6-702. 
G) The finding of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. 
Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not 
properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(k) If the court does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has 
been committed or that the minor committed it, the court shall dismiss the 
infonnation and discharge the minor. The court may enter findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not 
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(1) At a preliminary examination, upon request of either party, and subject to Title 
77, Chapter 38, Victim Rights, the court may: 
(1) (1) exclude witnesses from the courtroom; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0)(2) require witnesses not to converse with each other until the preliminary 
examination is concluded; and 
0)(3) exclude spectators from the courtroom. 
Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 23A 
Rule 23A. Hearing on conditions of Section 78A-6-702; bind over to district 
court. 
(a) If a criminal indictment under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the commission of a 
felony, the court shall, upon the request of the minor, hear evidence and detennine 
whether the conditions of paragraph ( c) exist 
(b) If a criminal infonnation under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the commission of a 
felony, after a finding of probable cause in accordance with Rule 22, the court shall 
hear evidence and detennine whether the conditions of paragraph ( c) exist 
( c) The minor shall have the burden of going forward as to the existence of the 
following conditions as provided by Section 78A-6-702: 
(c)(1) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult; 
(c)(2) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the 
minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and 
(c)(3) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent, 
aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
(d) At the conclusion of the minor's case, the state may call witnesses and present 
evidence on the conditions required by Section 78A-6-702. The minor may cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 
( e) If the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions 
required by Section78A-6-702 are present, the court shall enter an order directing the 
minor to answer the charges in district court 
(f)(1) Upon entry of an order directing the minor to answer the charges in district 
court, the court shall comply with the requirements of Title 77, Chapter 20,_ Bail. By 
issuance of a warrant of arrest or continuance of an existing warrant, the court may 
order the minor committed to jail in accordance with Section 62A-7-201. The court 
shall enter the appropriate written order. 
(f)(2) The clerk of the juvenile court shall transmit to the clerk of the district court 
all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings in the juvenile court 
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(f)(3) The jurisdiction of the court shall tenninate as provided by statute. 
(g) If the court finds probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed 
and that the minor committed it and also finds that all of the conditions of Section 
78A-6-702 are present, the court shall proceed upon the infonnation as if it were a 
petition. The court may order the minor held in a detention center or released in 
accordance with Rule 9. 
Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 28 
Rule 28. Scheduling of minors' cases. 
(a) Proceedings concerning alleged violations of law shall be scheduled and 
conducted separately for each minor except as provided hereafter. 
(b) Where more than one minor is involved in the same law violation or criminal 
episode, and all such minors are apprehended and charged at or about the same time, 
proceedings may be consolidated and heard together before the same judge. 
However, if any party objects to consolidation on the record or in writing, remaining 
proceedings shall be heard separately as to the objecting minor. The court may, for 
good cause shown, order that any such separate hearings be held with respect to 
disposition whether requested or not. 
(c) Proceedings with respect to minors in the same family or household, even when 
they do not involve allegations of the same law violations or criminal episode, may be 
consolidated unless objected to by any party. In that event, the court shall schedule 
separate hearings to protect the interest of the objecting party as appears appropriate. 
( d) Where a minor is named in a petition which alleges violations of the law and in a 
separate petition alleging other grounds for jurisdiction, such as dependency or 
neglect, the petitions may be consolidated. 
Utah Rule of Juvenile Procedure 43 
Rule 43. Evidence. 
(a) Except as set forth herein or as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court 
shall adhere to the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(b) All oral testimony before the court shall be given under oath unless waived by 
the parties, and may be narrative in fonn or by stipulated proffer of testimony or as 
otherwise provided by these Rules. 
-~ 
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(c) Written notice of the intent to offer a statement under Utah Code Section 
78A-6-115(5) must be given to all parties at least five days prior to the adjudication 
hearing in which the statement is going to be offered. The court may, upon good 
cause shown, waive the requirement for five days notice. 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.0 
RULE 1.0 TERMINOLOGY 
(a) ''Belief' or ''believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed 
the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from 
circumstances. 
(b) "Confinned in writing," when used in reference to the infonned 
consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the 
person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming 
an oral infonned consent. See paragraph (f) for the definition of "informed 
consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the 
person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it 
within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(c) "Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of 
infonnation reasonablysufficient to permit the client to appreciate the 
significance of the matter in question. 
( d) ''Finn" or ''law finn" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, 
professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized 
to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the 
legal department of a corporation or other organization. 
(e) ''Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the 
substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose 
to deceive. 
(£) ''Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed 
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information 
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available 
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct 
(g) "Knowingly," ''know'' or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in 
question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. 
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(h) ''Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law 
finnorganized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association 
authorized to practice law. 
(i) ''Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer 
denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. 
G) ''Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a 
lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the 
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable. 
(k) ''Reasonably should know'' when used in reference to a lawyer denotes 
that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the 
matter in question. 
(I.) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a 
matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that 
are reasonablyadequate under the circumstances to protect infonnation that 
the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other_ law. 
(m) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a 
material matter of clear and weighty importance. 
(n) ''Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration 
proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in 
an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other 
body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the 
presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a 
binding legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular 
matter. 
( o) ''Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a 
communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, photostating, photography, audio or videorecording and e-mail. A 
"signed" writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to 
or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person 
with the intent to sign the writing. 
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